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INTRODUCTION
In the modern era, the world faces a stark paradox in understanding the risk
of fast-moving pathogens. While science brings enormous acumen for
discovering and developing countermeasures (vaccines and pharmaceuticals),
the potential for explosive pandemics has never been greater.1 Why?
Globalization propels pathogens more rapidly than ever across borders,
regions, and the world. Mass migration, intercontinental travel, urbanization,
and intense animal–human interchange facilitate the emergence of microbes
from the forests and animal life to humans; then, these dangerous microbes
spread uncontrollably.2
These dynamics have resulted in a significant increase in outbreaks since
1980: 12,012 outbreaks of 215 infectious diseases were recorded between 1980
and 2013, accounting for more than 44 million cases in 219 countries.3 In
recent years, the world has experienced a series of health crises spanning
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle Eastern respiratory
syndrome (MERS), Ebola virus disease, and novel avian (H5N1) or human
(H1N1 and H7N9) influenzas.4 At the height of each crisis, politicians often
overreact (e.g., implementing unnecessary travel and trade restrictions or
quarantines).5 In interpandemic periods, authorities underprepare. Lurching
between complacency and panic is a dysfunctional strategy; while scientists
cannot predict when the next pandemic will occur, or the exact pathogen at
play, there will be a destructive pandemic in the foreseeable future.6
Naturally occurring infectious diseases are not the only threat. In an age of
terrorism, it is not just guns, explosives, and chemical or radiologic hazards
that destabilize communities and countries; there is also the prospect of
1
See Lawrence O. Gostin & Ana S. Ayala, Global Health Security in an Era of Explosive Pandemic
Potential, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2017).
2
See COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED.,
SECRETARIAT, THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS
DISEASE CRISES 1 (2016) [hereinafter THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY].
3
See INT’L WORKING GRP. ON FIN. PREPAREDNESS, FROM PANIC AND NEGLECT TO INVESTING IN
HEALTH SECURITY: FINANCING PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AT A NATIONAL LEVEL 6 (2017); Katherine F.
Smith et al., Global Rise in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks, J. ROYAL SOC’Y. INTERFACE, Dec. 6, 2014,
at 1, 2.
4
See Emergencies Preparedness, Response: Disease Outbreaks by Year, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/en/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
5
See, e.g., Johanna Neuman, Swine Flu: Time to Close the U.S.-Mexico Border?, L.A. TIMES, (Apr.
28, 2009, 8:10 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/04/swine-flu-time-to-close-theusmexico-border.html (responding to the threat of swine flu from Mexico by proposing to close the United
States-Mexico border).
6
See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 17.
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accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens. One week after the
September 11th terrorist event, anthrax spores were mailed to media and U.S.
senators, killing five people, infecting seventeen others, and grinding the postal
system to a halt.7 In 2004, a Russian scientist (working at one of two known
repositories of smallpox virus) died after accidentally pricking herself with a
needle contaminated with the Ebola virus.8
Given the proliferation of scientific information on the internet, reputable
scientists can create dangerous pathogens. So-called “garage” laboratory
scientists can also acquire this skill, by which individuals handle highly
virulent microbes without adequate scientific training and security
precautions.9 As early as 1994, researchers genetically sequenced the extinct
and deadly smallpox virus, openly publishing the results.10 A researcher in
Canada recently synthesized the extinct horsepox virus—a cousin of the
smallpox virus—using commercially available genetic materials.11 New
genetic technologies make it possible to recreate or “enhance” pathogens,
making them more transmissible, virulent, or both.12
Even more worrying is when pathogens evolve and adapt to form resistant
strains. Pathogens that gain resistance to most, or all, antimicrobial
medications could unravel the gains made by modern medicine, returning the
world to a pre-antibiotic era. The prospect of losing once highly effective drugs
goes well beyond emerging novel infections: antimicrobial resistance makes
common hospital-acquired infections (e.g., staph infections) potentially lethal,
and undermines progress against enduring infectious diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—causing a drumbeat of suffering and
death worldwide.13

7
Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded, NPR (Feb. 15, 2011, 11:00 AM) http://www.npr.org/
2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded.
8
Judith Miller, Russian Scientist Dies in Ebola Accident at Former Weapons Lab, N.Y. TIMES (May
25, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/world/russian-scientist-dies-in-ebola-accident-at-formerweapons-lab.html.
9
See Heidi Ledford, Life Hackers, 467 NATURE 650, 650 (2010).
10
See Robert F. Massung et al., Analysis of the Complete Genome of Smallpox Variola Major Virus
Strain Bangladesh-1975, 201 VIROLOGY 215 (1994).
11
Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Scientists Synthesize Smallpox Cousin in Ominous Breakthrough,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2017/07/07/
scientists-synthesize-smallpox-cousin-in-ominous-breakthrough/?utm_term=.caa2b275e57a.
12
See generally Jan van Aken & Edward Hammond, Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, 4
EMBO REP. S57 (2003) (providing a systematic overview of the potential impact of biotechnology on the
development of biological weapons).
13
See Antimicrobial Resistance, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
fs194/en/ (last updated Sept. 2016).
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There is another truth that society must confront: dangerous pathogens will
never be conquered. Despite awe-inspiring scientific advancement, pathogens
are an enduring part of the ecosystem. While public health has achieved
notable victories such as the eradication of smallpox and the near elimination
of wild polio, microbes have had millennia to learn how to adapt and survive.14
Instead, “smart” public health does not pretend to be able to eliminate
infectious disease threats, but rather ameliorates the risk through rapid
detection and effective response before outbreaks spread widely within
communities, countries, and regions.
Part I explains the rising global hazard posed by infectious diseases, while
emphasizing the extent to which the international community continually
underestimates and underinvests in pandemic planning and response—despite
the clear lessons of animal and human history. It argues that the need to shore
up preparedness is more acute than ever. The world faces looming threats,
namely rising populations, urbanization, mass migration, rapid travel and trade,
climate change, weak states, and ethno-nationalism. Through modest
investments, the international community could ensure greater global health
security. Yet, political resolve to work cooperatively and internationally to
build a more secure world may be waning with the rise of ethno-nationalistic
populism, which cuts against the most important value in global health: mutual
solidarity. A nationalist “country first” ideology risks destabilizing global
action against fast-moving epidemics.
Part II offers a blueprint for a more secure future—a strategy that keeps the
world safe from pathogenic threats that are equal to, or exceed, any other
hazard facing humankind. States must migrate from the current reactive
approach to one of thoughtful preparedness. What would it take to create a
decidedly more secure world? What steps must we put in place to bolster
defenses against infectious diseases? What are the political, financial, and
regulatory obstacles standing in the way?
This Article proposes a new paradigm for global preparedness, rejecting
the current narrow silos of health assistance, such as disease-specific
interventions or eradication. Global health security requires economic
investment, strong international institutions, resilient national health systems,
targeted research and development, and effective communication with affected
14
Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children–United States, 1990-1998, 48
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 246 (1999); see also R.G. Webster & D.J. Hulse, Microbial
Adaptation and Change: Avian Influenza, 23 REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE [REV. SCI. & TECH.] 453
(2004) (Fr.) (discussing the ability of the influenza virus to genetically evolve).
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populations. We place particular emphasis on reform of the World Health
Organization (WHO or Organization) and emergency response within the U.N.
system. The values that ought to guide future action include cooperative action,
shared responsibility, equity and fairness, and global norms that are respected
and enforced.
I.

SHORT-SIGHTED POLICIES: UNDERESTIMATING THE THREAT

At the 2017 Munich Security Conference, Bill Gates observed, “Whether it
occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, . . . a fast-moving
airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year.
And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such
an outbreak in the next 10–15 years.”15 Few other events—not war, a
devastating earthquake, or conventional terrorism—pose the same probability
and severity of risk.
Yet, politicians careen between panic and complacency. Microbial threats
garner scant political attention or resources until they hit a critical threshold.16
Financing global health preparedness represents only a fraction of the sums
devoted to more conventional threats, such as chemical, nuclear, and even
conventional threats from terrorism.17
This dynamic is illogical. Infectious diseases are not a new or unexpected
threat, but have been a constant presence throughout human history, causing
untold suffering and innumerable deaths. Ancient Egyptian mummies harbor
traces of tuberculosis,18 while the fourteenth century Black Death took over
20 million lives in Europe alone—nearly a third of the continent’s
population.19 The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 infected a third of the world’s
people, with an estimated 50 million deaths.20 During the Crimean War (1845–
1856), approximately ten times as many British soldiers died from dysentery

15
Bill Gates, BILL GATES: A New Kind of Terrorism Could Wipe Out 30 Million People in Less Than
a Year–And We Are Not Prepared, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
bill-gates-op-ed-bio-terrorism-epidemic-world-threat-2017-2.
16
See Ed Yong, The Deadly Panic-Neglect Cycle in Pandemic Funding, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/panic-neglect-pandemic-funding/543696/.
17
See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 1.
18
Andreas G. Nerlich et al., Molecular Evidence for Tuberculosis in an Ancient Egyptian Mummy, 350
LANCET 1404 (1997).
19
Black Death, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/black-death (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
20
Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15 (2006).

GOSTIN GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

A BLUEPRINT FOR A COMMON SECURE FUTURE

3/30/2018 9:22 AM

343

than from battle; during the Boer War (1899–1902), the ratio was five to one.21
Similarly, uncontrolled infectious diseases caused two-thirds of all deaths
during the American Civil War—predominantly pneumonia, typhoid, diarrhea
and dysentery, and malaria.22 While the above epidemics took place in the preantimicrobial era, they also occurred before air travel and globalization. And
we now face the frightening prospect of gravitating to a pre-antimicrobial era.
Yet, our ability to contain disease has been transformed in many ways. For
much of history, humans’ primary response to infectious disease was
reactive—trying in vain to separate infected persons from the population—
whether through quarantines, cordon sanitaire (a guarded area preventing
people or animals from entering or leaving), and travel or trade restrictions.23
But with the advent of evidence-based public health and modern medicine,
societies developed and invested in powerful ways to prevent, detect, respond
to, and treat disease.
Now, public health is capable of sophisticated surveillance—meticulous
tracking and monitoring of infections worldwide. A visit to the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) emergency operations center will
show that real-time data is tracked on novel infections in every corner of the
globe.24 Similarly, WHO tracks around 3,000 signals a month; very few ever
pose a threat—but some do, and will become mass killers.25
Further, biomedical countermeasures have rendered certain dreaded
pestilences largely relics of the past. WHO helped to eradicate smallpox in
1980, and is on the way to doing the same for polio.26 WHO resolution
WHA66.12 urges Member States to expand and implement the Global Plan to
Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases, which could signal the end of neglected
tropical diseases such as Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm), Leishmaniasis, and

21
Clive Bell & Maureen Lewis, The Economic Implications of Epidemics Old and New 5 (Ctr. for
Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 54, 2005).
22
Jeffrey S. Sartin, Infectious Diseases During the Civil War: The Triumph of the “Third Army,” 16
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 580, 582 (1993).
23
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
416, 424 (3d ed. 2016).
24
See Emergency Operations Centers: CDC Emergency Operations Center (EOC), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/eoc.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2016).
25
See Health Emergencies Represent Some of the Greatest Risks to the Global Economy and Security,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 8, 2017), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2017/g20-summit/en/.
26
Smallpox, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/en/ (last visited June 30,
2017); see Poliomyelitis, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/ (last
visited June 30, 2017).
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Human
African
trypanosomiasis
(sleeping
sickness).27
Through
pharmaceuticals and vaccinations, dangerous diseases like yellow fever and
malaria can be prevented and treated. Scientists quickly brought to market an
effective vaccine for influenza A(H1N1) during the 2009 pandemic, and are
now developing a Zika vaccine28 in the aftermath of the 2016–2017 epidemic
in the Americas.
Additionally, new therapeutic agents and technologies allow scientists to
ever more rapidly identify pathogens’ weaknesses and develop medical
countermeasures. New methods, such as the gene editing system “Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats” (CRISPR), hold great
promise for developing vaccines and treatments, as do innovative methods of
stemming disease vectors, such as reducing mosquito populations.29
Despite these gains, the global hazard level may be greater than ever
before. Since the 1980s, successive emerging infectious diseases have
reminded the international community that infectious diseases continue to
cause devastating harms. Indeed, the HIV/AIDS epidemic shattered the myth
that infectious diseases were a concern of the past.30 By the mid-1990s,
HIV/AIDS was a leading cause of death in the United States in people aged
twenty-five to forty-four,31 and was spreading out of control in sub-Saharan
Africa.32 Since the beginning of the epidemic, more than 70 million people

27
World Health Assembly, Neglected Tropical Diseases, at 2, WHA66.12 (May 27, 2013),
http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/mediacentre/WHA_66.12_Eng.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL
PLAN TO COMBAT NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 2008–2015 2–3 (2007) (urging Member States to expand
and implement the Global Plan to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases 2008–2015 which identifies priority
diseases including those listed in the text above).
28
See Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/vaccine_preparedness/en/ (last visited June 30, 2017); Zika Virus
Vaccines, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/zikavaccines (last visited June 30, 2017).
29
See Valentino M. Gantz et al., Highly Efficient Cas9-Mediated Gene Drive for Population
Modification of the Malaria Vector Mosquito Anopheles Stephensi, 112 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. USA E6736,
E6742 (2015); Liang et al., A CRISPR/Cas9 and Cre/Lox System-Based Express Vaccine Development
Strategy Against Re-Emerging Pseudorabies Virus, SCI. REP., Jan. 18, 2016, at 1, 1; see also Michael Le Page,
Boom in Human Gene Editing as 20 CRISPR Trials Gear Up, NEW SCIENTIST (May 30, 2017),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/
2133095-boom-in-human-gene-editing-as-20-crispr-trials-gear-up/.
30
Daniel M. Fox, AIDS and the American Health Polity: The History and Prospects of a Crisis of
Authority, MILBANK Q., 2005, at 1, 2–3.
31
See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/history/hivand-aids-timeline (last visited June 30, 2017).
32
See SOULEYMANE MBOUP ET AL., DISEASE AND MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Dean T.
Jamison et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006).

GOSTIN GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

A BLUEPRINT FOR A COMMON SECURE FUTURE

3/30/2018 9:22 AM

345

have been infected and about 35 million people have died.33 Globally,
36.7 million people were living with HIV in 2016.34
Recent disease outbreaks, such as SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009, and the
ongoing Zika epidemic, have been less devastating in terms of scale, but
continue to expose global under-preparedness.35 The West African Ebola
epidemic caused over 11,000 deaths36 in three of the world’s poorest
countries.37 Future threats loom that could break out at any time, such as the
SARS-like coronavirus that erupted in Saudi Arabia and South Korea
(MERS),38 or highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9), currently
circulating in China.39 Accordingly, biomedical developments must not lull the
international community into a state of complacency, feeling—wrongly—
invincible from pathogens.
A. Drivers of Disease
Patterns and trends of modern life counter momentous scientific advances.
While globalization and economic development bring enormous social
benefits, there are also hidden costs: hyper-crowded cities, rapid air travel,
mass migrations, and intense human–animal interchange alter how pathogens
emerge and colonize, thus amplifying the risk and severity of outbreaks.
Conflict zones unravel health systems and spur exoduses. Expanding human
populations into new geographic areas, climate change, deforestation, intensive
33
Fact Sheet–Latest Statistics on the Status of the AIDS Epidemic, UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/
resources/fact-sheet (last visited June 30, 2017).
34
Id.
35
Robert Roos, CDC Estimate of Global H1N1 Pandemic Deaths: 284,000, U. MINN. CTR. FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (June 27, 2012), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/newsperspective/2012/06/cdc-estimate-global-h1n1-pandemic-deaths-284000 (noting that the CDC estimates
284,000 deaths attributed to 2009 A(H1N1)); Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1
November
2002
to
31
July
2003,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (attributing 774 deaths to
SARS between November 1, 2002 and July 31, 2003); Michael McCarthy, Microcephaly Risk with Zika
Infection
Is
1-13%
in
First
Trimester,
Study
Shows,
BMJ
(May
31,
2016),
http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i3048.
36
See Ebola Outbreak 2014-2015, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/
(last visited June 30, 2017) (listing 11,310 deaths from Ebola from 2014–2015).
37
See U.N. List of Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-DevelopedCountries.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (listing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the thirty-five least
developed countries).
38
See Agence France-Presse, South Korea: Mers Virus Outbreak Is Over, GUARDIAN (Jul. 27, 2015,
10:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/south-korea-mers-virus-outbreak-is-over.
39
Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm (last updated August 28, 2017).
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farming, and food production shift the web of interactions between humans,
animals, and the planet, as never before.
1. Rising Populations, Megacities, and the Loss of Natural Habitats
A major feature of human civilization is an ever-increasing population
migrating en masse to cities. In 2007, for the first time in history, more of the
world’s population lived in urban areas than rural.40 Africa and Asia are
urbanizing faster than any region and are expected to be 56% and 64% urban,
respectively, by 2050.41 By 2050, the world’s population is estimated to rise to
9.7 billion.42
In crowded cities, dense populations of humans and animals often live in
close proximity, fueling transmission of novel viruses from animals to humans,
and then human to human. Natural habitats are lost through deforestation and
extractive industries, like logging or mining, to ensure that vast populations
have food, potable water, and abundant energy.43 Dams, irrigation, and
deforestation increase vector-borne diseases such as malaria and Rift Valley
fever.44 Backyard chicken flocks, wet (live animal) markets, and intense
animal husbandry of poultry, pigs, and cows create troubling risks of zoonotic
leaps to humans, such as avian influenzas and foot-and-mouth disease.45 As
domesticated animals infect wild birds (and vice versa), microbes travel on
avian transcontinental migration routes.46 The threat from zoonotic diseases
cannot be overstated, constituting the majority (approximately 75%) of new or
emerging infectious diseases.47

40
See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 7 (2014); see
also World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF.
(July 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html.
41
UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., supra note 40, at 1.
42
World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, supra note 40.
43
Deforestation, WILDSCREEN ARKIVE, http://www.arkive.org/c/deforestation (last visited June 30,
2017).
44
Samuel S. Myers et al., Human Health Impacts of Ecosystem Alteration, 110 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD.
SCI. USA 18753, 18754 (2013).
45
See Jun Yuan et al., Effect of Live Poultry Market Closure on Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus Activity
in Guangzhou, China, 2014, 21 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1784 (2015) (documenting the effect of live
poultry market closures on A(H7N9) virus detection and viability in Guangzhou, China); Tjeerd Kimman et
al., Assessing and Controlling Health Risks from Animal Husbandry, NJAS–WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCI., July 3,
2013, at 7, 8.
46
See Kurt D. Reed et al., Birds, Migration and Emerging Zoonoses: West Nile Virus, Lyme Disease,
Influenza A and Enteropathogens, 1 CLINICAL MED. RES. 5, 8 (2003).
47
See Zoonotic Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
onehealth/basics/zoonotic-diseases.html (last visited June 30, 2017).
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While there is no single cause of a zoonotic leap, these factors can combine
to create a perfect storm for outbreaks, such as the Ebola epidemic in West
Africa. The rise in Ebola outbreaks since 1994 is associated with drastic
changes in forest ecosystems in tropical Africa; indeed, the combination of
“extensive deforestation and human activities in the depth of the forests may
have promoted direct or indirect contact between humans and a natural
reservoir of the virus.”48 The “index” case of the West African epidemic was
most likely a young boy having eaten bush meat (like a fruit bat)—a pestilence
literally emerging from the jungle.49
2. Rapid Travel and Trade
Globalization propels travel and trade, allowing microbes to span the globe
at greater speed. Through globalized trade, infected animals transmit zoonotic
diseases to new reaches. In 2001, diseased animals spread foot-and-mouth
disease from the United Kingdom to Ireland and the Netherlands,50 resulting in
millions in economic losses. Likewise, affordable air travel has exploded in
recent decades, meaning that a pathogen can rapidly span the globe through an
unsuspecting host.51 It is possible to reach any corner of the world within
twenty-four hours,52 and passengers may harbor infectious diseases and
transport disease vectors.53 And the world is undergoing an historic migrant
crisis as refugees and asylum-seekers flood across borders from conflict zones.
Consider this: from 2015 to 2018, the CDC recorded 5,372 travel-related
cases of Zika, compared to 228 locally transmitted cases.54 In May 2015, a
man returning from travel in the Middle East introduced MERS to South

48
See J.J. Muyembe-Tamfum et al., Ebola Virus Outbreaks in Africa: Past and Present, 79
ONDERSTEPOORT J. VETERINARY RES., no. 2, 2013, at 1, 3 (2012).
49
See Dennis Lynch, Ebola Patient Zero: Emile Ouamouno of Guinea First to Contract Disease, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ebola-patient-zero-emile-ouamouno-guineafirst-contract-disease-1714698.
50
Patrick J. O’Reilly et al., Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Ireland; History, Diagnosis, Eradication, and
Serosurveillance, in REPORT OF THE SESSION OF THE RESEARCH GROUP OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL
COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE 46 (2002).
51
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 39 (2014) [hereinafter GLOBAL HEALTH LAW].
52
Id.
53
Mary E. Wilson, Travel and the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, 1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 39, 41 (1995).
54
Zika Cases in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
zika/reporting/case-counts.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2018) (showing that these figures relate to U.S. states;
U.S. territories recorded 37,165 symptomatic Zika virus cases, with only 147 of them in travelers returning
from affected areas).
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Korea, leading to three-dozen deaths.55 In April 2009, Mexico and the United
States reported the first confirmed cases of swine influenza (A/H1N1) to the
WHO.56 On June 11, Dr. Margaret Chan declared the start of the 2009
influenza pandemic, with seventy-four countries reporting 28,744 cases.57 Nine
weeks after the first reported case, every WHO region reported cases of
H1N1.58 Mass travel will continue to rapidly propel disease, underlying the
need to enhance global health security.
3. Climate Change
Historic changes in climate and the environment can unleash pathogenic
risks that could devastate the world. Increased rainfalls multiply mosquitobreeding sites, which is especially problematic in areas with inadequate
sanitation systems.59 Global warming expands the geographic range of disease
vectors, notably mosquitoes, and enables them and the diseases they carry to
spread to new regions, subjecting previously unexposed populations to
infections, such as chikungunya, dengue, and Zika.60 Warmer temperatures
also affect the lifecycles of certain pathogens. Waterborne diseases, such as
cholera, become harder to fight with rising temperatures and flooding.61
Yemen, which has been decimated by war and famine, is now facing the worst

55
K.H. Kim et al., Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-Cov) Outbreak in South
Korea, 2015: Epidemiology, Characteristics and Public Health Implication, J. HOSP. INFECTION, Feb. 2017
207, at 207.
56
GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 39; see Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in Two
Children–Southern California, March-April 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 400 (2009)
(stating that two laboratory-confirmed cases were reported in California).
57
Influenza A(H1N1)–Update 47, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 11, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/
2009_06_11/en/; Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Statement to the Press (June 11, 2009),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/en/.
58
GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 39. For a step-by-step progression of the pandemic, see The
2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009–April 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (last updated June 16, 2017).
59
See Linda Marsa, Hot Zone—A Warming Planet’s Rising Tide of Disaster, DISCOVER (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://discovermagazine.com/2010/dec/04-hot-zone-warming-planets-rising-tide-of-disaster.
60
See Climate Risk and Spread of Vector-Borne Diseases, CLIMATE NEXUS, http://climatenexus.org/
learn/public-health-impacts/climate-change-and-vector-borne-diseases (last visited June 30, 2017).
61
See Climate Change and Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/globalchange/
summary/en/index4.html (last visited June 30, 2017).
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cholera outbreak in the world.62 U.N. relief workers brought cholera to Haiti in
2010, and the nation is still in the grips of an unrelenting epidemic.63
Arctic thawing from climate change could release long-dormant bacteria
and viruses, for which humans have no immunity, that have been trapped in ice
and permafrost for millennia.64 In August 2016, in the Yamal Peninsula within
the Arctic Circle, a twelve-year-old boy died and twenty people were
hospitalized after being infected by anthrax.65 A historic heat wave that
summer thawed a long-dead reindeer infected with anthrax bacteria.66
4. Fragile States and Violent Conflict
Civil strife—such as the Syrian civil war, political conflict in Libya, or
bombing in Yemen—weakens populations’ defenses, while further fueling
mass migrations. The world is experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis since
World War II, with 20 million people facing starvation and famine in
northeastern Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.67 Where states
collapse or cannot govern, basic public health protections are decimated,
sanitation systems cease to operate, immunization programs are disrupted, and
health systems erode.68 As a result, diseases like wild polio can re-emerge in
unstable countries, such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria.69
Mass movement of families fleeing violence transports diseases across
borders, while refugee camps congregate people closely in unhygienic

62
Sarah Toy, Yemen Faces Worst Cholera Outbreak in the World, Health Authorities Say, USA TODAY
(June 28, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/06/28/yemen-facing-worst-choleraoutbreak-world-health-authorities-say/436858001/.
63
See Rick Gladstone, U.N. Brought Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nationspeacekeepers-yemen.html.
64
See Jasmin Fox-Skelly, There Are Diseases Hidden in Ice, and They Are Waking Up, BBC (May 4,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170504-there-are-diseases-hidden-in-ice-and-they-are-waking-up.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Associated Press, World Faces Worst Humanitarian Crisis Since 1945, Says UN Official, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 10, 2017, 9:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/world-faces-worst-humanitariancrisis-since-1945-says-un-official.
68
See ENRICO PAVIGNANI & SANDRO COLOMBO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., ANALYSING DISRUPTED
HEALTH SECTORS: A MODULAR MANUAL 208 (2009); see also TONY VAUX & EMMA VISMAN, CTR. FOR INT’L
CO-OPERATION & SEC., DEP’T OF PEACE STUDIES, UNIV. OF BRADFORD, SERVICE DELIVERY IN COUNTRIES
EMERGING FROM CONFLICT 67–73 (2005) (discussing how conflict negatively impacted the Ugandan health
system).
69
See Luma Akil & H. Anwar Ahmad, The Recent Outbreaks and Reemergence of Poliovirus in War
and Conflict-Affected Areas, 49 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 40, 41 (2016).
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conditions.70 As vulnerable mass populations flee areas of conflict, drought, or
flood, they may bring microbes with them.71 As temperatures change,
disturbances in food production can create famines, forcing people to flee in
search of food.72 Hungry people may destroy forests and other natural habitats
to grow their crops.73
The West African Ebola epidemic revealed another truth—the public
health gains discussed above are inequitably distributed. Global inequalities of
wealth and scientific resources critically undermine epidemic preparedness.
Despite improvements, around 400 million people lack access to one of the
following: clean water, adequate sanitation, or resilient health systems.74 Even
if vaccines or medicines are available in high-income countries, low- and
middle-income states often lack access.75 While lower-income countries bear
disproportionate risks, every country is vulnerable as infectious diseases
rapidly spread from country to country, region to region, and worldwide. All
nations—whether rich or poor—face common vulnerabilities.
5. Antimicrobial Resistance
Many scientists view antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and antibacterial
resistance (ABR) as some of the most significant threats facing the world.76
Once treatable infections (e.g., hospital-acquired Staphylococcus aureus,
malaria, and tuberculosis) become resistant to all known treatments, treatments
will harken back to the days before the advent of antibiotic and antiviral
medications.77 Today, the world’s most disadvantaged people face the highest
burden from hard-to-treat infections. A couple hundred thousand people die
70
See S.J. Cutler, Refugee Crisis and Re-emergence of Forgotten Infections in Europe, 22 CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY INFECTION 8–9 (2015); see also Christos Louis, Médecins Sans Frontières and the Refugee
Crisis in Greece: An Interview with Dr. Apostolos Veizis, 110 PATHOGENS GLOBAL HEALTH 219–22 (2016).
71
See Climate Change and Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/globalchange/
summary/en/index4.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); Humanitarian Health Action: Flooding and
Communicable Diseases Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/flood_
cds/en/ (last visited June 30, 2017);.
72
See Somini Sengupta, Heat, Hunger and War Force Africans onto a “Road on Fire,” N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/15/world/africa/agadez-climate-change.html.
73
See LAUREN BENNETT, CLIMATE INST., DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2017).
74
See New Report Shows that 400 Million Do Not Have Access to Essential Health Services, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (June 12, 2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/uhc-report/en/.
75
See BERYL LEACH ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT: INCREASING ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 24 (2005).
76
See generally ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: GLOBAL REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE 2014, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2014), http://www.who.int/drugresistance/documents/surveillancereport/en/.
77
See At UN, Global Leaders Commit to Act on Antimicrobial Resistance, U.N. NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016),
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55011#.V-QoiRNVhBc.
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every year of drug-resistant tuberculosis,78 which is perhaps humankind’s
oldest microbial nemesis. By 2050, the regions most at risk for drug-resistant
infections will include sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Indian
subcontinent; and globally, deaths from AMR could climb to 10 million every
year.79 AMR plagues even the richest countries and world-class health
facilities, as seen in the 2011 outbreak of multi-drug resistant Klebsiella
pneumoniae bacteria at the National Institutes of Health, causing six deaths.80
But the proliferation of AMR and ABR organisms is avoidable; it has
arisen as a result of discrete and destructive ways in which we have developed,
or not, our health systems and farms—prophylactic antibiotic use in farmed
animals, indiscriminate medical prescribing, and poor hospital infection
control.81 The vast global networks in the manufacture and sale of substandard
or falsified medications pose another major risk to the integrity and
effectiveness of antimicrobials.82 Global health experts estimate that the illicit
sale of substandard and falsified medicines is as great, if not much greater, than
trafficking of illicit drugs such as cocaine.83 Falsified and substandard
medications often contain sub-therapeutic doses of a drug’s active ingredient.84
When patients buy these drugs unknowingly in a street market or on the
internet, ineffective dosages enable microbes to become resistant.85 In short, it
is the behavior of human beings that enable superbugs to thrive.

78
See REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, TACKLING DRUG-RESISTANT INFECTIONS: FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2016).
79
See REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: TACKLING A CRISIS FOR
THE HEALTH AND WEALTH OF NATIONS 5, 9 (2014); see Fergus Walsh, Superbugs to Kill “More Than
Cancer” by 2050, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-30416844.
80
See NIH Uses Genome Sequencing to Help Quell Bacterial Outbreak in Clinical Center, NAT’L
INSTS. HEALTH (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-uses-genomesequencing-help-quell-bacterial-outbreak-clinical-center.
81
James A. Ayukekbong et al., The Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance in Developing Countries:
Causes and Control Strategies, ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE & INFECTION CONTROL 2 (May 15, 2017),
https://aricjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13756-017-0208-x?site=aricjournal.biomedcentral.
com.
82
See id.; see also Antibiotic Resistance from the Farm to the Table, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/challenges/from-farm-to-table.html (last visited March 1, 2017).
83
See COUNTERING THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED AND SUBSTANDARD DRUGS 72–73 (Gillian J. Buckley
& Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2013).
84
Id. at 3.
85
See THE EVOLVING THREAT OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: OPTIONS FOR ACTION, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 39 (2012).
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6. Ethnocentric Nationalistic Politics
It is axiomatic that infectious diseases do not respect borders. Global heath
preparedness is not a national project, but a global responsibility. Yet, populist
politicians rail against the very values needed for global health preparedness:
international cooperation, strong global institutions, and mutual solidarity.86
Populist leaders are more likely to be inward-looking and less likely to provide
robust technical and financial assistance to poorer countries. Instead, hypernationalists erect walls, literally and figuratively, putting country “first,” ahead
of the world’s population and the planet we inhabit. They renege on promises
of humanitarian assistance87 and global climate change solidarity; they
undermine international organizations; and they blame “the other.”
The United States is experiencing a pronounced shift to ethno-nationalism.
In 2003, President George W. Bush created the President’s Emergency
Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the largest global health program for a
single disease in history.88 In 2017, President Donald Trump proposed to cut
funding for vital public health agencies, such as the CDC89 and the National
Institutes of Health, while eliminating the Fogarty International Center, which
builds health capacities in low- and middle-income countries.90
These pivots away from mutual solidarity are dangerous for global health.
Cooperative action, moreover, is in every country’s national interest. Health
security in high-income states becomes imperiled when poorer countries lack
basic health infrastructures. No legal or physical barrier can impede the spread
of a microbe so minute that it cannot be seen. Fighting a pathogenic threat
where it arises is far less expensive and far more effective than waiting until
the pestilence reaches our shores.

86
See Miles Kahler, President Trump and the Future of Global Governance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/president-trump-and-future-global-governance.
87
See Lawrence O. Gostin, Best Evidence Aside: Why Trump’s Executive Order Makes America Less
Healthy, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 5, 5–6.
88
See Myra Sessions, Overview of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), CTR.
FOR GLOB. DEV., https://www.cgdev.org/doc/HIVAIDSMonitor/OverviewPEPFAR.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2017); see also About Us, U.S. PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, https://www.pepfar.gov/
about/270968.htm (last visited July 11, 2017).
89
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations, Appropriations Committee
Releases the Fiscal Year 2018 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education Funding Bill, (July 12, 2017),
https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394995.
90
See Lawrence Gostin, JAMA Forum: The Fogarty International Center, a National Treasure for
Global Health, NEWS@JAMA (Apr. 27, 2017), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2017/04/27/jama-forum-thefogarty-international-center-a-national-treasure-for-global-health/.
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B. Underinvesting in Preparedness: The Economic Costs of Epidemics
Despite wealthy countries’ reluctance to invest in pandemic preparedness,
infectious diseases are not only a matter of public health, but also a serious
economic concern. The National Academy of Sciences projects that novel
infectious diseases will cost the global economy $60 billion per year,
amounting to $6 trillion per century.91 What makes these data chilling is that
they are not estimated, but rather expected minimum costs that are virtually
certain to unfold given historical events. Further, these expected costs are
direct costs only;92 we argue that they miss the vast impact of epidemics on
global trade, travel, tourism, and worker productivity, which are harder to
accurately estimate; and the toll on families and communities that can unravel
social support networks.
Other economic models predict much higher costs. The World Bank
estimates potential losses from a severe influenza pandemic—a once-or-twiceper-century event—at $3 trillion in global direct and indirect losses or 4.8% of
global GDP.93 The National Bureau of Economic Research estimates a figure
of $490 billion that includes mortality costs.94 A further approximation
suggests that the added annual global cost of moderate-severe to severe
pandemics is roughly $570 billion, or 0.7% of global income.95 In the United
States alone, the CDC reports that international trade with countries that are at
high risk of outbreaks (referred to as “first and second order” threat countries)
represents $308 billion annually, accounting for 1.6 million U.S. jobs.96 Major
infectious disease events would imperil all this economic activity, and
probably more.
Although economic modeling is inexact, economic losses are steeped in
reality. Disease outbreaks have caused massive economic disruption. The 2003

91
See Anas El Turabi & Philip Saynisch, Modeling the Economic Threat of Pandemics, in THE
NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 109, 111. Please note, all dollar figures refer to
U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified.
92
Id. at 113.
93
OLGA JONAS, WORLD BANK, PANDEMIC RISK 2 (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/
dam/Worldbank/document/HDN/Health/WDR14_bp_Pandemic_Risk_Jonas.pdf; see Pandemic Preparedness
and Health Systems Strengthening, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/pandemics (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018).
94
See Victoria Y. Fan et al., The Inclusive Cost of Pandemic Influenza Risk, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 22137, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22137.
95
See id.
96
Cynthia H. Cassell et al., Relevance of Global Health Security to the U.S. Export Economy, 16
HEALTH SECURITY 563, 567 (2017).
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SARS outbreak cost East Asia $40 billion;97 annual seasonal influenza costs
the United States $87 billion;98 and Ebola caused Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone at least $2.2 billion in lost economic growth.99 Global losses due to the
six major zoonotic disease outbreaks from 1997 through 2009 cost on average
$6.7 billion per year.100
At the societal level, catastrophic pandemics like HIV/AIDS dampen
productivity by removing workers from the workforce and increasing
absenteeism.101 Children are robbed of their parents, prompting knock-on
effects on economic growth.102 Often their parents’ condition means they
cannot access education,103 leading to worse job prospects. Economic activities
such as farming are disrupted, affecting workers and food security; access to
vital services like health care is impacted, meaning that chronic conditions go
untreated and increase in severity.104 In fact, illnesses and deaths from
preventable causes (e.g., cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and complications of
child birth) may have affected more people than Ebola itself during the
epidemic in West Africa, as people avoided health facilities, while some health
centers closed.105
The costs are amplified by fear that prompts individuals, companies, and
governments to overreact and alter their behavior.106 As Tedros Adhanom

97
Jong-Wha Lee & Warwick J. McKibbin, Estimating the Global Economic Costs of SARS, in
LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY 92, 103
(Knobler et al. eds., 2004).
98
Noelle-Angelique Molinari et al., The Annual Impact of Seasonal Influenza in the US: Measuring
Disease Burden and Costs, 25 VACCINE 5086, 5092 (Oct. 2007).
99
See World Bank Group Ebola Response Fact Sheet, WORLD BANK (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/brief/world-bank-group-ebola-fact-sheet. See generally JONAS,
supra note 93.
100
See WORLD BANK, 2 PEOPLE, PATHOGENS AND OUR PLANET: THE ECONOMICS OF ONE HEALTH xii
(2012).
101
Kazeem O. Okosun et al., Analysis of Recruitment and Industrial Human Resources Management for
Optimal Productivity in the Presence of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 39 J. BIOLOGICAL PHYSICS 99–121 (2013);
see also Matthew P. Fox et al., The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Labour Productivity in Kenya, 9 TROPICAL MED.
& INT’L HEALTH 318–24 (2004); Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least
Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331 (2008).
102
See Epidemics and Economics, ECONOMIST (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/
1698814.
103
Id.
104
See Ebola and Other Disease Outbreaks: Implications for Economic Growth and Trade, U.S.
AGENCY INT’L DEV. (July 2015), https://www.msh.org/sites/msh.org/files/agoa_brief_final.pdf.
105
See Kim J. Brolin Ribacke et al., Effects of the West Africa Ebola Virus Disease on Health-Care
Utilization–A Systematic Review, 4 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Oct. 10, 2016, at 1, 2.
106
See Sulzhan Bali et al., Long Shadow of Fear in an Epidemic: Fearonomic Effects of Ebola on the
Private Sector in Nigeria, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 11 (2016).
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Ghebreyesus, the current WHO Director General, recently put it—when an
outbreak hits, there are two epidemics—“one caused by the virus, and the other
one caused by fear.”107 For instance, while SARS claimed fewer than 800
lives, its economic costs are estimated at $40 billion.108 Tourism often suffers
as vacationers seek to avert ill health by traveling elsewhere. During the SARS
outbreak, hoteliers in Hong Kong experienced record-low bookings, driven by
fear of contracting the disease.109 The MERS outbreak in South Korea led to a
20% fall in tourism in 2015,110 while in Sierra Leone, hotel occupancy plunged
from 70% to 13% in one year during the Ebola outbreak.111
Fear of disease also leads consumers to avoid retail stores, sports and
music events, and cinemas. Although trade often moves online, outbreaks
primarily affect local, small sellers.112 Beyond human behavior are the actions
of governments themselves—along with the private sector—that overreact
through quarantines and travel bans.113 Even rational government action can
take an economic toll; the mass culling of chickens to prevent the spread of
avian influenza deprives individuals of private property, and farmers may be
under-compensated for lost livestock.114
Overall, we see an all-too familiar pattern repeated in historical cycles:
under-preparedness in times of calm, juxtaposed with frenetic activity and calls
for action in times of crisis, followed by a return to complacency. Albert
Camus described this phenomenon in fiction mirroring reality:
Everybody knows that pestilences have a way of recurring in the
world; yet somehow we find it hard to believe in ones that crash
down on our heads from a blue sky. There have been as many

107
Health Emergencies Represent Some of the Greatest Risks to the Global Economy and Security,
supra note 25.
108
Robert F. Breiman et al., Role of China in the Quest to Define and Control SARS, in LEARNING FROM
SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 97, at 56, 57;
LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note
97, at 12.
109
See Grace C.L. Chien & Rob Law, The Impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Hotels,
22 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 327–32 (2003).
110
See Iain Marlow, What’s the Economic Impact of the MERS Outbreak in South Korea?, GLOBE &
MAIL (June 18, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/whats-the-economic-impactof-the-mers-outbreak-in-south-korea/article25031999/.
111
See Ebola and Other Disease Outbreaks, supra note 104.
112
See Bali et al., supra note 106.
113
See infra Section II.C.5.
114
See J.A. Backer et al., Controlling Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks: An
Epidemiological and Economic Model Analysis, 121 PREVENTATIVE VETERINARY MED. 142–50 (2015).
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plagues as wars in history; yet always plagues and wars take
people equally by surprise.115
II. A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY
Having identified the major social, economic, and political challenges
impeding preparedness, we now turn to a blueprint for a more secure world.
First, we examine the economic investment needed to create a more secure
world.
A. The Peace Dividend
In response to the vast direct and indirect economic costs of major
outbreaks, virtually every expert in global health security has urged sustained
investments in health systems, research and development, and robust
international institutions.116 This is not only economically sound, but also
promises economic benefits. Prevention is far more efficient than response.
The World Bank estimates that investing in pandemic preparedness for
zoonotic diseases alone could yield between $11.6 and $26.6 billion in global
benefit, depending on the severity of the pandemic.117 Further, countries with
reduced burdens of devastating diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, have more robust economic growth—a more productive workforce,
enhanced consumer spending, and fewer demands on health and social
services.118
What level of economic investment is required to ramp up preparedness? In
2012, the Word Bank estimated that $1.9 to $3.4 billion was required to
upgrade zoonotic disease prevention and control systems in developing
countries to meet World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO
standards.119 In 2016, the Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework
proposed a peace or security dividend—an incremental additional investment
of $4.5 billion per year for health systems, emergency response, and research;

115

ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 34 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Alfred A. Knopf, 1957) (1948).
See, e.g., Phyllida Travis et al., Overcoming Health-Systems Constraints to Achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, 364 LANCET 900–06 (2004); Dongbao Yu et al., Investment in HIV/AIDS Programs:
Does It Help Strengthen Health Systems in Developing Countries?, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 8 (Sept. 16,
2008), https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-4-8.
117
WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at 23.
118
See John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria, in THE INTOLERABLE
BURDEN OF MALARIA 85, 94 (Joel G. Breman et al. eds., 2001).
119
See WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at xi.
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that is, just sixty-five cents per person per annum would buy the world far
greater security.120
Table I: “Annual Expected Rate of Return on Investments in Prevention”121

Reduction in
expected
disease
outbreak
impact

20%
50%
100%

Disease Outbreaks Prevented
Mild Pandemic
Severe Pandemic
Low
High
Low
High
Preventive
Preventi Preventiv Preventi
Effort
ve Effort
e Effort
ve Effort
31%
14%
49%
25%
65%
44%
88%
57%
97%

71%

123%

86%

More broadly, the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
determined that high-income countries should allocate 0.1% of gross national
income (GNI) to official development assistance (ODA) for health.122 Yet, in
2009, ODA for health from wealthier countries was 0.048% of GNI, half of
what is required by this measure.123 The majority of this spending was not for
strengthening health systems, but rather for targeting specific diseases such as
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and polio. A small fraction of global health
assistance goes to developing capabilities for surveillance and rapid response
to emerging diseases.124
The same is true of in-country spending. In April 2001—in Abuja,
Nigeria—African Union countries pledged to allocate at least 15% of their
annual budget to the health sector and urged donor countries to scale up
support.125 A decade later, only two countries have reached this target, and
seven countries actually decreased their health sector expenditures.126 Current
donor spending varies dramatically.127

120

THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 82.
WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at 23.
122
See COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN
HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12 (2001).
123
See OECD, STATISTICS ON RESOURCE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2011).
124
OECD, MEASURING AID 50 YEARS OF DAC STATISTICS – 1961–2011 13 (2011).
125
See THE ABUJA DECLARATION: TEN YEARS ON, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1–2 (2011).
126
Id.
127
Id.
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If preparedness offers such good economic yields and the devastation
caused is on par with, or far exceeds, other disasters—chemical, nuclear, or
natural—why do countries fail to ensure health security? The West African
Ebola outbreak will certainly yield a new tranche in preparedness, particularly
WHO reform. In 2014, the Gates Foundation committed more than $500
million toward research and development “to stay ahead of emerging disease
threats.”128 Yet, previous outbreaks such as SARS and H1N1 also led to
similar calls that were never sustained.129 Why is it that countries fail to meet
financing targets and respect international norms? The World Bank suggests
the answers include complexity of the task, the limited perceived returns, and
competing demands as key determinants.130 Political leaders seek demonstrable
short term “wins”—sustainable systems for shoring up defenses in the long
term seems outside their political attention span. Instead, governments need to
understand and act on the clear economic and human dividends of investing in
preparedness.
B. Strong International Institutions with National Commitment to Global
Norms
Leadership from well-functioning global institutions forms the apex of
global health security. Infectious diseases rapidly transcend borders, requiring
strong international institutions to set norms and coordinate action.131
International institutions can develop the global standards, offer the technical
assistance, and mobilize the resources to prevent, detect, and respond to
outbreaks. U.N. institutions in particular have the legitimacy to promote crossborder cooperation, information sharing, and compliance with international
rules. Investing in institutions will produce dividends for population health and
human security.
Yet, trust in international institutions crumbled in the aftermath of the West
African Ebola epidemic. U.N. institutions proved to be utterly underprepared
and underfunded, unable to mount a swift response.132 The leading global
128
See Gates Foundation Commits More than $500 Million to Tackle the Burden of Infectious Disease
in Developing Countries, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
Media-Center/Press-Releases/2014/11/ASTMH-Address.
129
See Harvey V. Fineberg, Pandemic Preparedness and Response—Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza
of 2009, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED 1335, 1335 (2014).
130
See INT’L WORKING GRP. ON FIN. PREPAREDNESS, supra note 3, at 10–11.
131
David P. Fidler, Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 180,
181–82 (2015).
132
See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Toward a Common Secure Future: Four Global
Commissions in the Wake of Ebola, 13 PLOS MED., May 19, 2016, at 1.
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health institution—WHO—exhibited marked dysfunction as headquarters in
Geneva could not coordinate effectively with WHO’s Regional Office for
Africa (AFRO) and country offices.133 Member States’ neglect of global
preparedness and WHO’s weaknesses were starkly highlighted with the deep
structural problems underlying the Organization becoming center stage. The
WHO Director-General at the time, Margaret Chan,134 appeared unresponsive
to desperate calls for help from the region, waiting more than four months after
international spread to declare a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern, even after Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) implored her to act.135
The West African Ebola epidemic spurred major WHO reforms, but it is
too early to know whether they will be adequate. Thus far, dynamic new
structures are in place, such as an Emergency Response Program and a
contingency emergency fund (discussed below), but both remain badly
underfunded.136 Meanwhile, the world continues to spring from complacency
to panic without building the long-term sustainability needed for a more secure
world. In short, we remain vulnerable to the next pandemic.
Instead, robust institutions require leadership, transparency, inclusive
participation (civil society and stakeholder engagement), and accountability—
abiding by the rule of law.137 Institutions, moreover, must lead by setting
authoritative norms, building robust health system capacities, and influencing
outcomes. Institutions that govern well will be more politically persuasive and
gain international legitimacy and public trust. Good governance will preserve
human rights, advance equity, curtail corruption, and ensure transparency and
accountability. Member States, moreover, must act as stakeholders invested in
the success of global institutions, while institutional leaders should act boldly
and competently. Although these benchmarks of good governance are
applicable to all institutions, we focus on WHO, along with the World Bank,
which launched new initiatives after the West African Ebola outbreak.

133
See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of
the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an
Empowered WHO at the Apex, 385 LANCET 1902 (2015).
134
Former Director-General: Dr. Margaret Chan, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/dg/chan/
en/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
135
Gostin & Friedman, supra note 133, at 1902.
136
See infra Section II.D.1.
137
See generally CHELSEA CLINTON & DEVI SRIDHAR, GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH: WHO RUNS THE
WORLD AND WHY? (2017).
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C. Enhanced Security Through the World Health Organization
No other institution has the legitimacy, partnerships, ties with health
ministries, or normative authority that WHO has. Established as the first U.N.
specialized agency in 1948, its 194 Member States each have an equal vote in
the World Health Assembly.138 Its constitution mandates WHO “to act as the
directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work,”139 working
collaboratively with U.N. organs, specialized agencies, and governments. The
constitution directs WHO “to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in
emergencies, necessary aid.”140 In light of this unique mandate, WHO leads the
U.N. Global Health Cluster, which coordinates forty-eight Health Cluster
partners (U.N. and non-U.N.) at the global level and over 300 country
partners.141
Despite its powerful mandate, the record of WHO in leading the global
response to infectious diseases has been mixed. Its signal achievement was to
eradicate smallpox in 1980,142 but it has not had as much success with other
eradication campaigns, such as malaria.143 Over time, the position of the
Organization as the guardian of global public health began to erode, sidelined
in fundamental ways by the World Bank, UNAIDS, the Global Fund, and large
donors such as the Gates Foundation. By the turn of the century, high-income
states lost confidence in the Organization.144 Marred by accusations of
corruption and cronyism, States steadfastly refused to increase the WHO
budget, and mostly earmarked funds for their own preferred projects through
public–private partnerships that were viewed as more nimble and efficient,
such as the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance.145
In the wake of the West African Ebola outbreak, many of WHO’s most
important functions are being monopolized by new public–private
partnerships. For instance, WHO should set priorities for vaccine development
and mobilization of resources for research and development. But even this vital

138

THE GLOBAL GUARDIAN OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2016).
See Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 2, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
140
See id.
141
See Secretariat, World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Health Workforce
Coordination in Emergencies with Health Consequences, at 4, WHO Doc. A70/11 (Apr. 13, 2017), http://apps.
who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA70/A70_11-en.pdf.
142
See World Health Org. Res. 33.3, WHA 33/1980/REC/1, at 1 (May 8, 1980).
143
See José A. Nájera et al., Some Lessons for the Future from the Global Malaria Eradication
Programme (1955–1969), 8 PLOS MED., Jan. 2011, at 1, 5.
144
GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 130.
145
See id. at 129–73.
139

GOSTIN GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

A BLUEPRINT FOR A COMMON SECURE FUTURE

3/30/2018 9:22 AM

361

task has shifted to the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations
(CEPI).146
Post-Ebola Global Commissions—by the U.N. Secretary-General, WHO,
the National Academy of Sciences, and Harvard University/London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine—provide fresh impetus to reform and
revitalize WHO’s constitutional mandate.147 While WHO has begun the reform
process, many of its deep-seated structural problems remain: (1) unsustainable
funding, (2) dysfunction between headquarters and regional offices,
(3) ineffective stewardship, (4) failure to actively engage civil society, and
(5) incapacity to ensure compliance with the International Health Regulations
(IHR). Finally, as discussed in more detail below, WHO’s emergency response
requires significant reform to avert future health catastrophes.
1. Unsustainable Funding
Systemic underfunding brought disastrous consequences for West Africa
and the world, yet WHO remains inadequately financed to respond to health
emergencies. WHO is chronically starved of funding, culminating in a budget
deficit of $300 million in 2010.148 In response, the Organization’s biennial
budget was cut by $1 billion, 35% of which came from funds dedicated to
epidemic preparedness and response.149 Currently, only about 20% of the
budget comes from member states’ mandatory contributions, which is needed
to ensure long-term, predictable, conflict-free funding that supports its ongoing
work in line with global health priorities.150
The rest of WHO’s funding comes from voluntary contributions mostly
earmarked for the donor’s selected project.151 Although voluntary contributions

146
See Mission, COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, http://cepi.net/mission (last
visited Feb. 16, 2018); infra Section II.D.2.
147
See Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next
Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386
LANCET 2204, 2216 (2015); THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2; U.N. HIGHLEVEL PANEL ON THE GLOB. RESPONSE TO HEALTH CRISES, PROTECTING HUMANITY FROM FUTURE HEALTH
CRISES ¶¶ 130, 133 (2016) [hereinafter U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL]; REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM
ASSESSMENT PANEL, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] ¶ 28 (2015) [hereinafter EBOLA INTERIM
ASSESSMENT PANEL].
148
GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 90.
149
See Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Security After Ebola: Four Global Commissions, 94
MILBANK Q. 34 (2016); Devi Sridhar & Lawrence O. Gostin, Reforming the World Health Organization, 305
JAMA 1585, 1586 (2011).
150
Sridhar & Gostin, supra note 149, at 1586.
151
Id.
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have always accounted for part of the budget, discretionary funding has
comprised the lion’s share since the 1990s.152 This has transformed WHO into
a donor-driven organization with powerful benefactors—such as the United
States, the European Union, and the Gates Foundation—heavily influencing
agenda-setting and priorities. Accordingly, global health priorities are badly
misaligned with the global burden of disease with funding reserved for specific
diseases or narrowly perceived national security interests placed high on the
global health agenda.153
The current budget is wholly incommensurate with WHO’s worldwide
mandate. To put it in perspective, WHO’s budget is just over a quarter of the
CDC’s, and less than the budget of a large hospital.154 WHO’s 2016–2017
budget was set at $4.39 billion, but was supplemented by $160 million to
finance the new WHO Health Emergencies Program.155 Its budget for 2018–
2019 of $4.42 billion is actually a decrease in real dollars. 156 This funding
pattern propagates a vicious cycle: Member States underfund the agency,
making it hard for WHO to succeed. When the Organization inevitably falls
short, donors further lose confidence and seek out other institutions for their
financial largess. This dysfunctional pattern may become more insecure with
two of its largest donors—the United States and United Kingdom—157
embroiled in the politics of ethno-nationalism.
Member States must become genuine shareholders in WHO by raising
contributions and doubling WHO’s overall budget. Reforms have begun to
increase WHO control over its budget and adjust financing to priorities.158 In
2013, World Health Assembly gave itself the power to approve the entire
budget, rather than only the assessed contributions.159 But WHO must go
152

Id. (stating that voluntary contributions comprise approximately 80% of the WHO’s budget).
See Lawrence O. Gostin, A Framework Convention on Global Health: Health for All, Justice for All,
307 JAMA 2087, 2089 (2012).
154
See Humanitarian Health Action: Donor Centre, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hac/
donorinfo/en/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
155
World Health Org. [WHO], 68th World Health Assembly, Proposed Programme Budget 2016-2017,
at 6, WHO Doc. A68/7 (Apr. 30, 2015); see Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE): Contributions and
Allocations, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/contingencyfund/contribution/en/ (last updated Dec. 22, 2017).
156
See World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Proposed Programme Budget 20182019, at 5, WHO Doc. A70/7 (Apr. 10, 2017).
157
See Nurith Aizenman, Trump’s Proposed Budget Would Cut $2.2 Billion from Global Health
Spending, NPR (May 25, 2017, 3:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/25/529873431/
trumps-proposed-budget-would-cut-2-2-billion-from-global-health-spending.
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Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization, 129 PUB.
HEALTH 854, 859 (2015).
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further. We argue that mandatory dues from Member States should comprise at
least 50% of the WHO budget—a proposition that is improbable in the age of
austerity. Perhaps more feasible is that WHO could charge overheads on
earmarked voluntary contributions of 20% to 30% for flexible voluntary
contributions to supplement its core budget.160 Still, WHO would risk losing
donors or driving them toward other multilateral or bilateral organizations that
do not charge overhead.161
2. Dysfunction Between Headquarters and Regional Offices
The decentralized structure of WHO poses further challenges that came to
the fore during the West African Ebola epidemic. WHO’s six regional offices
are uniquely independent within the UN system, with full power over regional
personnel.162 During the outbreak, Director-General Chan and AFRO fought
over control, perhaps hindering international assistance.163 AFRO did not
convene health ministers or open a regional coordination center until three
months after Ebola was confirmed.164 In January 2015, the Director-General
deflected responsibility, saying that it was the obligation of AFRO to
respond.165
To address these challenges, WHO headquarters should exercise greater
oversight and control over regional personnel and decision making. WHO
should fully disclose the funds held within each regional office and how
regions meet health objectives, with monitoring and benchmarks of success.
Even if decentralized decision making remains the norm, WHO should apply
the same yardstick across regions to assess efficiency and effectiveness.
Regional offices can be effective. Member States, for example, generously
fund the Pan American Health Organization (WHO’s regional office for the
Americas), which has gained wide respect. During the Zika epidemic, it was
proactive, taking the lead from WHO headquarters in Geneva.166
160

Sridhar & Gostin, supra note 149, at 1586.
Id.
162
Health Statistics and Information Systems, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/healthinfo/
global_burden_disease/definition_regions/en/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2017); see also David P. Fidler, Ebola
Report Misses Mark on International Health Regulations, CHATHAM HOUSE (July 17, 2015), http://www.
chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/ebola-report-misses-mark-international-health-regulations#.
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See Somini Sengupta, Effort on Ebola Hurt W.H.O. Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/01/07/world/leader-of-world-health-organization-defends-ebola-response.html.
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Gostin & Friedman, supra note 133, at 1904.
165
See Sengupta, supra note 163.
166
See WHO and PAHO Initiative to Support 17 New Research Proposals on Zika in Seven Countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, PAHO, http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=12998%3Awho-and-paho-initiative-to-support-17-new-research-proposals-on-zika-in-seven161
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3. Ineffective Stewardship
WHO operates in a sea of powerful actors; it must reestablish its legitimacy
as the guardian of global health. Currently, WHO struggles to compete:167
Global health governance is packed with approximately 200 international
health institutions, spanning public international organizations (e.g., UNICEF,
UNAIDS), public–private partnerships (e.g., GAVI, Global Fund, UNITAD,
and CEPI), and philanthropies (e.g., Gates, Rockefeller, and Ford
foundations).168 The proliferation of global health actors has yielded new
funding sources, innovative governance, and civil society engagement. Yet, the
global landscape is plagued by failures of leadership, accountability, and
coordination.169
WHO should influence and coordinate the many institutions and regimes
that affect and intersect with global health security. Intellectual property, for
example, can undermine access to essential medicines; trade in services
impacts health worker migration; and climate change implicates food, disease
vectors, and natural disasters. The Organization should advocate the
importance of global health security and how complementary sectors can
protect human wellbeing. WHO must work closely with the OIE to ensure
coordination with animal health and harmonized approaches to AMR. It must
guide the World Trade Organization (WTO) in fulfilling its mission of trade
liberalization while respecting the right to the highest attainable standard of
health. In turn, these institutions can shore up their understanding of global
health and advance health in decisions and norms. For instance, during the
H1N1 pandemic, the Food and Agriculture Organization, OIE, and WTO
issued joint statements with WHO, discouraging trade restrictions on pigs or
pig products.170 Through stewarding international governance, WHO can
underscore the multifaceted threat posed by outbreaks.

countries-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean&catid=740%3Apress-releases&Itemid=1926&lang=en
(last
updated Feb. 23, 2017, 5:47 PM); see also Donald G. McNeil Jr., How the Response to Zika Failed Millions,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/health/zika-virus-response.html.
167
See COLIN MCINNES ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 8 (2014).
168
See STEVEN J. HOFFMAN ET AL., CHATHAM HOUSE, MAPPING GLOBAL HEALTH ARCHITECTURE TO
INFORM THE FUTURE 24–30 (2015).
169
MCINNES ET AL., supra note 167, at 8.
170
See Joint FAO/WHO/OIE/WTO Statement on Influenza A(H1N1) and the Safety of Pork, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (May 2, 2009), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090502/en/; see
also Joint FAO/WHO/OIE/WTO Statement on Influenza A(H1N1) and the Safety of Pork, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (May 7, 2009), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090430/en/.
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4. Failure to Actively Engage Civil Society
Civil society plays a crucial role in health security. Nongovernmental
organizations often are the first to identify threats, issue urgent calls to action,
support sufferers, and hold governments and international organizations to
account. Often civil society organizations lead the humanitarian response, as
MSF did during the West African Ebola outbreak.171 Community-based
organizations understand local cultures and can guide health behaviors from
within.
Yet, WHO’s engagement with civil society is limited. Reflecting the
principle of state sovereignty, non-state actors play no formal role in WHO
governing structures. This contrasts with newer organizations, like UNAIDS,
which includes civil society on its governing board, although with non-voting
status.172 Civil society, businesses, and foundations may be full board members
of the Global Fund and GAVI Alliance.173 Yet, WHO has devised a
cumbersome process that inhibits nongovernmental organizations from
participating in governance meetings. NGOs must gain “official relations”
status to take part, even in their non-voting capacity.174 WHO rules require
these organizations to have international membership or scope,175 which often
excludes domestic, poorly funded, and small NGOs.176 Even NGOs that gain
official status often struggle to be heard.177
WHO must make it simpler for stakeholders to participate. The Executive
Board and Assembly should be open to NGO participation. For example,
WHO could offer scholarships to developing country NGOs. It could expand
opportunities for civil society input, such as by allowing extemporaneous
statements, facilitating NGO side sessions, and conducting open hearings.
171
See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, PUSHED TO THE LIMIT AND BEYOND: A YEAR INTO THE LARGEST
EVER EBOLA OUTBREAK 6 (2015).
172
UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board [UNAIDS], 2012-2015 Unified Budget, Results and
Accountability Framework UNAIDS Engagement with Civil Society, ¶ 79, UNAIDS/PCB (34)/14.CRP5
(June 6, 2014).
173
See Civil Society, GLOBAL FUND, https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/civil-society/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2018); see also Civil Society Organisations, GAVI: VACCINE ALLIANCE, http://www.gavi.org/about/
partners/cso/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
174
See Principles Governing Relations with Nongovernmental Organizations, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/governance/civilsociety/principles/en/ (last visited July 13, 2017).
175
See World Health Org. [WHO], 69th World Health Assembly, Framework of Engagement with NonState Actors, ¶ 51, WHO Doc. A69/10 (May 28, 2016).
176
See GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 118.
177
See Thomas Schwarz, A Stronger Voice of Civil Society at the World Health Assembly?, MEDICUS
MUNDI INT’L NETWORK (June 2010), http://www.medicusmundi.org/contributions/reports/2010/a-strongervoice-of-civil-society-at-the-world-health-assembly.
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Going further, to reflect modern governance structures, WHO should include
civil society as part of its governance structure—even if this would require a
constitutional amendment. And from the very earliest moments of an outbreak,
it should work closely with civil society to develop culturally sensitive
responses.
5. Incapacity to Ensure Compliance with the IHR
WHO has unparalleled normative powers. Article 2 of its constitution
authorizes the World Health Assembly “to propose conventions, agreements
and regulations, and make recommendations with respect to international
health matters.”178 Article 19 permits the World Health Assembly to adopt a
convention by two-thirds vote, while article 20 directs members to “take
action” by accepting or rejecting the convention or agreement within eighteen
months after adoption.179 To date, the World Health Assembly has adopted
only one convention, which has been a powerful force for global health—the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.180
The Organization’s authority to adopt regulations is even more remarkable.
By article 22, regulations enter “into force for all Members after due notice has
been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members
as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the
period stated in the notice.”181 Consequently, States must proactively “opt out”
or they are automatically bound. Perhaps standing alone in international law,
the Constitution of the WHO permits the imposition of binding obligations
absent a State’s express assent.
The IHR is the Organization’s most prominent regulation, standing as the
governing authority for global health security.182 However, the Organization
has struggled to secure State compliance with the Regulations. Countries
continue to clutch sovereignty, often failing to internalize international norms,

178

See Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 139, at art. 2(k).
Id. at arts. 19–20.
180
See About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/en/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2017); see also World Health Organization
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 41032 [hereinafter FCTC].
181
See Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 139, at art. 22
182
World Health Organization International Health Regulations, May 23, 2005, 2509 U.N.T.S. 44861
[hereinafter IHR].
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endangering global health. Developing countries, moreover, lack the financial
and technical assistance needed to ensure their health system capacities.183
The 2005 revision of the IHR—in response to SARS—implemented vital
reforms, including an “all-hazards” strategy (instead of targeting specific
diseases), early state reporting (articles 6 and 7), use of unofficial (non-State)
data sources (article 9.1), and development of health-system capacities to
prevent, detect, and respond to potential public health emergencies of
international concern (PHEIC) (article 5.1).184 The IHR empowers WHO to
coordinate stakeholders and make recommendations. Yet, as highlighted by
recent public health emergencies, weaknesses remain.185
Under the IHR, WHO’s Director-General has the power to declare a
PHEIC (article 12.1) and issue temporary recommendations to 196 States
Parties (article 15).186 The Director-General decides—based on advice from an
emergency committee, available evidence from the state and extraneous
sources, scientific principles and evidence, and an assessment of the risk to
human health—risk of international spread and interference with international
traffic (article 12.4).187 Since entry into force, the Director-General has
declared four PHEICs: influenza (H1N1) (2009), polio (2014), Ebola (2014),
and Zika (together with associated neurological conditions) (2016).188
Yet, WHO failed to convene an emergency meeting for Ebola or declare a
public health emergency for four and a half months.189 WHO was also
criticized during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic when the Organization was accused
of promoting panic.190 Further, its designation of polio as a PHEIC has
prompted criticism, given that only a handful of wild polio cases had been
identified.191 A more flexible governance structure could enable WHO to
183
See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Global Health Law Trilogy: Towards a Safer, Healthier,
and Fairer World, 390 LANCET 1918 (2017).
184
IHR, supra note 182. Article 1 defines a PHEIC as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as
provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international
spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.” Id.
185
See Gostin et al., supra note 132, at 4.
186
See IHR, supra note 182, at art. 12.1, 15.
187
Id. at art. 12.4.
188
See World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International
Health Regulations (2005): Annual Report on the Implementation of the International Health Regulations
(2005) Report by the Director-General, at 5, WHO Doc. A70/15 (May 17, 2017).
189
See Moon et al., supra note 147.
190
See Lena H. Sun et al., Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations Failed to Stop the
Ebola Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/10/04/howebola-sped-out-of-control/?utm_term=.af2a6cf9cfd2.
191
See Lawrence O. Gostin & Rebecca Katz, The International Health Regulations: The Governing
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mount earlier, event-specific responses. Post-Ebola global commissions
proposed an intermediate-level emergency declaration and/or a standing
emergency committee to continuously monitor circulating pathogens of
concern.192 Enhancing transparency and accountability would improve
international confidence.
Further, when outbreaks arise, governments and private actors often
overreact. While the IHR aim to balance trade (article 2)193 and human rights
(article 3.1),194 States routinely ignore the Director-General’s
recommendations in favor of overly punitive, non-evidence based restrictions
on trade and travel, fearing economic and other harm.195 During the Ebola
epidemic, over 30% of IHR States Parties disregarded WHO
recommendations, imposing more restrictive measures than recommended.196
Under international trade law, States have a right to restrict trade to protect
human, animal, and plant life or health.197 But lawful restrictions require
sufficient scientific evidence with a scientific risk assessment. Further, traderestricting health measures must be non-discriminatory and the least traderestrictive measures possible.198
Similarly, the IHR require States Parties to promptly notify WHO of events
that may constitute a PHEIC with an ongoing obligation to inform and respond
to follow-up requests (article 6.2).199 Yet, States have hesitated to report
suspected outbreaks, fearing the imposition of travel bans and trade
restrictions, and resulting loss of tourism. While dispute resolution is available
(article 56),200 it is subject to parties’ consent, and the Director-General has not
held States accountable for counterproductive travel and trade restrictions or
publicly identified uncooperative governments.

Framework for Global Health Security, 94 MILBANK Q. 264, 273 (2016).
192
See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 133, at 1906.
193
See IHR, supra note 182, at art. 2.
194
Id. at art. 3.1.
195
See Wendy Rhymer & Rick Speare, Countries’ Response to WHO’s Travel Recommendations During
the 2013-2016 Ebola Outbreak, 95 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 10, 13 (2017),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/95/1/16-171579/en/.
196
Id.
197
See The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement), WORLD TRADE ORG. art. 2.1, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017).
198
Id. at art. 2.3.
199
See IHR, supra note 182, at art. 6.2.
200
See id. at art. 56.
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To enhance compliance, WHO should publicly request States Parties to
justify additional measures and urge private actors against restrictions. WHO
should publicize States that impose unnecessary travel and trade restrictions.
States Parties should consider pursuing dispute mediation through the DirectorGeneral or compulsory arbitration. Successful cases brought by States harmed
by travel or trade restrictions or human rights violations would be a powerful
precedent to enhance compliance. Trade restrictions could also be challenged
through the WTO, as Mexico did during the H1N1 pandemic.201 Yet, WTO
dispute resolution can drag on for years, meaning economic damage is already
inflicted.202 Lastly, the World Health Assembly could amend the IHR to raise
temporary recommendations to a binding status.
D. Reforming Emergency Response
WHO must undergo fundamental technical reform if it is to attain its
rightful position as leader in coordinating global health security. In the wake of
Ebola, the Organization has developed new responses: (1) the Health
Emergencies Program, (2) the Contingency Fund for Emergencies, and (3) the
Global Health Emergency Workforce. Meanwhile, the World Bank established
the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus, the first African Director-General of WHO, has promised a
robust commitment to epidemic preparedness and response, with WHO acting
in a leadership role.203 Yet, the new Director-General’s record is mixed—he
served as health minister of Ethiopia, a country with a dismal human rights
record, and during his post, Ethiopia was accused of covering up a cholera
epidemic.204
1. WHO Health Emergencies Program
In March 2016, drawing on recommendations of the panels that reviewed
WHO’s response to Ebola, WHO launched the Health Emergencies Program;

201
See generally Import Restrictions on Pork Products Due to Influenza A/H1N1, WORLD TRADE ORG:
SANITARY & PHYTOSANITARY INFO. MGMT. SYS., http://spsims.wto.org/en/SpecificTradeConcerns/View/279
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
202
See GILLIAN J. BUCKLEY & RACHEL E. PITTLUCK, GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK: PANDEMIC
FINANCING 8, 74 (2016).
203
See Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Remarks to G20 Health
Emergencies Represent Some of the Greatest Risks to the Global Economy and Security (July 8, 2017),
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2017/g20-summit/en/.
204
See Lawrence O. Gostin, The World Health Organization’s Ninth Director-General: The Leadership
of Tedros Adhanom, 95 MILBANK Q. 467, 459 (2017).
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the 2018–2019 WHO budget provides $554.2 million in financing.205 The
Program aimed to “deliver rapid, predictable, and comprehensive support to
countries and communities as they prepared for, faced, or recovered from
emergencies caused by any type of hazard to human health, whether disease
outbreaks, natural or man made disasters, or conflicts.”206 Designed to be agile
and streamlined, it has one clear line of authority, one workforce, one budget,
one set of rules and processes, and one set of standard performance metrics. It
creates a common structure combining infectious hazard management, country
preparedness, health emergency information and risk assessment, emergency
operations and management, and administration.207 Standard operating
procedures are being developed to safeguard more coherent and clear
responses and improve communication.208
The Program will draw on existing strengths, partnering with U.N.
agencies, States, and nongovernmental organizations, such as MSF. An
Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee oversees and monitors
progress of the Program. Yet, while the Committee has members from national
governments, international organizations, and civil society, they are appointed
by the Director-General,209 which potentially undermines its independence.
2. Novel Funding Mechanisms: Contingency Fund for Emergencies
The failure to provide a quick release of funds to the world’s most
impacted countries is one of the most widely recognized causes of the rapid
spread of Ebola in 2014. Even countries with resources can flounder; during
the alarming spread of Zika throughout the Americas, it took Congress 233
days to pass President Obama’s emergency request for funding—eventually
agreeing to $1.1 billion ($800 million less than requested).210 This inertia
205
See World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Proposed Programme Budget 20182019, at 5, WHO Doc. A70/5 (May 26, 2017).
206
See Anne Gulland, WHO to Set Up Emergencies Programme, BMJ (May 31, 2016), http://www.bmj.
com/content/353/bmj.i3052.
207
Update WHO Health Emergencies Programme: Progress and Priorities Financing Dialogue,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 7 (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/financingdialogue/whe-update.pdf.
208
Id. at 4.
209
See Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the WHO Health Emergencies Programme:
Terms of Reference, WORLD HEALTH ORG. § 3, http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/
oversight-committee/Terms-of-Reference-Independent-Oversight-Committee.pdf?ua=1 (last visited July 13,
2017).
210
Alison Kodjak, Congress Ends Spat, Agrees to Fund $1.1 Billion to Combat Zika, NPR (Sept. 28,
2016, 3:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/28/495806979/congress-ends-spat-overzika-funding-approves-1-1-billion.
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delayed the speed of research and development, including vital vaccines.211
Delayed reactions following disease epidemics prompt the question, should an
emergency fund be put in place that can rapidly deploy resources when an
outbreak strikes?
Two global initiatives aim to ensure the rapid flow of funding early in an
outbreak. First, WHO launched an emergency contingency fund in the
aftermath of Ebola alongside the Health Emergencies Programme. Yet, despite
the clear need for flexible resources capable of rapid deployment, it is yet to be
fully funded. Second, in 2016, World Bank President Jim Kim launched the
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility.
a. WHO Emergency Contingency Fund
Before the West African Ebola epidemic, WHO labored under the belief
that it could mobilize funds rapidly in the face of a crisis. But the absence of
readily available resources led to fatal delays.212 Therefore, the World Health
Assembly launched a specific, replenishable contingency fund with a target
capitalization of $100 million.213 The Contingency Fund for Emergencies
seeks to fill a critical gap from the beginning of an emergency until resources
from other financing mechanisms begin to flow, but only for a maximum of
three months.214
The fund is financed by flexible voluntary contributions, not additional
core funding through mandatory assessed dues.215 If one considers the billions
of dollars in humanitarian assistance, $100 million seems inadequate. Further,
as of June 2017, the fund is far from meeting even this modest target—with
contributions amounting to a mere $41 million.216 Adding resources to WHO’s
core budget would have been more viable and sustainable. The program has
echoes of the African Public Health Emergency Fund, which began
211
See Reuters, How a Long Delay in Congress Hurt the Effort to Fight Zika, FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/10/03/zika-virus-funding-delay/.
212
See Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Ebola: A Crisis in Global Health Leadership, 384
LANCET 1323, 1323 (2014).
213
Contingency Fund for Emergencies, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.who.int/
about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/contingency-fund/Contingency-Fund-Emergencies.pdf?ua=1;
see
Director-General, World Health Org. [WHO] 68th World Health Assembly, 2014 Ebola Virus Disease
Outbreak and Follow-up to the Special Session of the Executive Board on Ebola: Options for Contingency
Fund to Support WHO’s Emergency Response Capacity, at 2, 7, Doc. A68/26 (May 12, 2015).
214
See Contingency Fund for Emergencies, supra note 213.
215
See Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE): Contributions and Allocations, supra note 155
(describing allocation figures as of June 15, 2017).
216
Id.
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disbursements to countries to help them respond to public health emergencies,
including disease outbreaks, and natural and manmade disasters. Yet, from
2012 to 2016, only thirteen African nations contributed a total of less than
$4 million.217
The trigger point for deployment of the fund is also important. The agency
plans to use its Emergency Response Framework grading system as the prompt
for drawing down the contingency fund, although the Assembly left the final
decision to the Director-General to determine when to deploy the emergency
fund for Grade 3 emergencies, the highest on the scale.218 To be effective, the
contingency fund must be commensurate with the need, sustainable, available
for rapid use, and of global reach.
b. Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility
In 2016, World Bank President Jim Kim launched the Pandemic
Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). The PEF is an insurance mechanism that
aims to rapidly provide funding for lower-income countries facing epidemic
outbreaks before they turn into pandemics.219 The PEF will be financed
through mobilizing and leveraging resources from the private sector
(reinsurance and capital markets) and the public sector, and disbursing them
quickly to governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and other agencies.220
PEF thereby functions as the first-ever insurance market for pandemics,
capable of rapidly disbursing financial resources for pandemic outbreaks. It
further marks the first instance in which World Bank has issued catastrophe
bonds for controlling infectious diseases.221 In the event of an outbreak, funds
are released based on “parametric triggers” to the world’s poorest countries
and international responders alike.222 The funding consists of an “insurance
window,” funded from a private insurance market and a “cash window,”

217
See Secretariat, Reg’l Office for Afr., World Health Org. [WHO], The African Public Health
Emergency Fund: The Way Forward, at 1, Doc. AFR/RC66/15 (July 27, 2016).
218
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], EMERGENCY RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 20 (2013).
219
See Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD BANK (May 9,
2017),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/pandemics/brief/pandemic-emergency-facility-frequently-askedquestions.
220
See Pandemic Preparedness and Health Systems Strengthening, supra note 3.
221
Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Group Launches Groundbreaking Financing Facility to
Protect Poorest Countries Against Pandemics (May 21, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2016/05/21/world-bank-group-launches-groundbreaking-financing-facility-to-protect-poorestcountries-against-pandemics.
222
Id.
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funded by donors.223 The cash window is a more flexible source of funds and
may be used to combat pathogens that are not dangerous enough to reach the
criteria for the insurance window.
Any country that qualifies for funding from the International Development
Agency (IDA), which finances the world’s poorest countries, will also be
eligible for funding from the PEF.224 Disease-causing viruses, such as new
influenza virus, coronaviruses, and filoviruses, are within the scope of PEF.
The World Bank estimates that if the PEF had existed in 2014, $100 million
could have been mobilized within three months, averting loss of life.225
The PEF is an important development, but requires adequate stewardship
by States. The cash window depends on donations. So far Japan and Germany
have committed $50 million, but since then, the PEF has not seen any
significant new funding from States.226 Further, the parametric trigger for
funds to be released has yet to be decided. What is WHO’s role? It further
remains unclear whether the IHR will govern PEF. The WHO DirectorGeneral could determine when the fund should be triggered, thereby
combining the expertise of WHO with the financial resources of the World
Bank. Further, entities that violate the IHR could be ordered to donate to the
private insurance fund of the PEF. These two remedies, however, face practical
and legal challenges. For example, if WHO vouches for the PEF and triggers
its payouts, might the agency violate securities regulations or otherwise incur
liability?
3. Global Health Workforce
As part of the Emergencies Program, WHO also developed a new Global
Health Emergency Workforce (GHEW) of independently verified teams of
capable responders from governments and civil society on standby to join
WHO and others in an emergency response, while supporting national
capacity.227 During the Ebola epidemic, international responders “faced
challenges in terms of scale, quality assurance, training, coordination,
223

Id.
Id.
225
Id.
226
Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Launches First-Ever Pandemic Bonds to Support $500
Million Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (June 28, 2017), http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/
World-Bank-Launches-First-Ever-Pandemic-Bonds-to-Support-500-Million-Pandemic-Emergenc.html.
227
See Director-General, supra note 213; see also Peter Salama, WHO’s New Emergencies Programme
Bridges Two Worlds, 95 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 8, 9 (2017), http://www.
who.int/bulletin/volumes/95/1/17-030117/en/.
224
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financing and opportunities to share lessons learnt between and among
deploying partners.”228 The new GHEW is made up of national and
international responders from networks and partnerships, including the Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), which pools human
resources and equipment, and the U.N. Inter-Agency Standing Committee.229 It
“aims to improve coordination, readiness and quality assurance in the
deployment” of Global Emergency Medical Teams (EMT).230
The new unit is designed for speed and flexibility, “showing what must
happen within 24, 48, and 72 hours, not months.”231 The EMT list sets
international minimum standards that teams must meet to be registered and
successfully vetted. This assures Member States that teams meet the required
standards.232 WHO is also adding logisticians and experts in risk
communication to its emergency staff.233
Yet, a global health workforce cannot be effective unless barriers to its
deployment are dismantled. During Ebola, airlines cancelled more than a third
of flights to West Africa,234 impeding the arrival of response teams, equipment,
and humanitarian aid. Some countries also restricted entry of anyone coming
from the region by erecting mandatory quarantines, as occurred in the United
States in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.235 Even Ebola-affected States
228

Director-General, supra note 213.
WHO’s New Health Emergencies Programme, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 31, 2016),
http://www.who.int/features/qa/health-emergencies-programme/en/.
230
See Nieves Amat Camacho et al., Education and Training of Emergency Medical Teams:
Recommendations for a Global Operational Learning Framework, PLOS CURRENTS DISASTERS 5 (Oct. 21,
2016), http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/education-and-training-of-emergency-medical-teams-recommendationsfor-a-global-operational-learning-framework/.
231
See Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Speech at the 68th World Health Assembly
(May 18, 2015), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/68th-wha/en/.
232
See James Gosney, WHO Emergency Medical Team Initiative & “WHO Minimum Technical
Standards and Recommendations for Rehabilitation for EMTs,” WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 2, 2016)
http://www.isprm.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/WHO-Emergency-Medical-Team-Initiative_WHOminimum-technical-standards-and-recommendations-for-rehabilitation-for-EMTs_James-Gosney_ISPRMWHOII-Session_ISPRM-2016_2-June-2016.pdf.
233
Chan, supra note 231 (discussing the Director-General’s efforts to “strengthen[] the skills base of my
emergency staff, adding logisticians, medical anthropologists, and experts in risk communication”); see also
Sheri Fink, W.H.O. Leader Describes the Agency’s Ebola Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/who-leader-describes-the-agencys-ebola-operations.html?
mcubz=3.
234
See Mark Anderson, Ebola: Airlines Cancel More Flights to Affected Countries, GUARDIAN (Aug.
22, 2014, 1:33 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/22/ebola-airlines-cancel-flights-guinealiberia-sierra-leone.
235
See Holly Yan & Greg Botelho, Ebola: Some U.S. States Announce Mandatory Quarantines—Now
What?, CNN (Oct. 27, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/health/ebola-us-quarantinecontroversy/index.html.
229
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refused or delayed to issue visas to emergency workers.236 Systems must be put
in place to expedite visas for foreign workers and permits to allow entry of
essential medical and humanitarian supplies. If health workers fall ill, there is
an ethical duty to provide the most effective available treatment and, if
necessary, medical evacuation.
4. Harnessing the U.N. System
Finally, while WHO should take the lead in a global health emergency, the
U.N. system can bolster security through enhancing legitimacy, improving
coordination, and stiffening political resolve. Where a public health crisis
reaches the highest levels of emergency,237 WHO should look to the United
Nations for reinforcement. Unlike the Director-General or World Health
Assembly, the U.N. Security Council can issue binding resolutions.238 In 2014,
the Security Council adopted a resolution declaring the Ebola epidemic a
“threat to international peace and security.”239 The Ebola resolution was only
the second time in its history that the Security Council acted to stem a public
health threat (AIDS was the first).240 To cement this role, one of the post-Ebola
review panels recommended a standing health committee within the Security
Council and a permanent U.N. “Accountability Commission” providing
system-wide assessments of international responses to major epidemics.241 The
U.N. Secretary General’s panel would have preferred to house the Standing
Committee with the General Assembly.242 Irrespective of where the standing
oversight function is placed, having the United Nations keep a watchful eye
over fast-moving epidemics would bolster political attention.
In September 2014, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon established the
United Nations’ first-ever emergency health mission, the United Nations
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER).243 Although it had
undoubted flaws, UNMEER can serve as a model for future outbreaks that
236
See Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Address at the Institute of Medicine Ebola
Workshop (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/18months-after-ebola-outbreak/en/.
237
See Funding and Funding Gap of WHO Grade 3 and Grade 2 Emergencies, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/hac/donorinfo/g3_contributions/en/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (explaining WHO’s criteria
for the highest levels of public health emergency).
238
See U.N. Charter art. 25.
239
S.C. Res. 2177, ¶ 5 (Sept. 18, 2014).
240
See S.C. Res. 1308, ¶ 2 (July 17, 2000).
241
See Moon et al., supra note 147, at 2204.
242
U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL, supra note, at 147, at ¶ 78.
243
UNMEER was established on September 19, 2014 after the unanimous adoption of resolutions by the
General Assembly and Security Council. G.A. Res. 69/1, ¶ 1–2 (Sept. 19, 2014); S.C. Res. 2177, supra note
239, ¶ 7.
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require a major U.N.-wide response. Its mandate was to lead and coordinate
the activities of U.N. agencies working on the ground to stop the outbreak.
UNMEER adopted a regional perspective and improved cross-border
coordination, information sharing, and monitoring of viral transmission. Yet,
while UNMEER galvanized political support, it bypassed existing
humanitarian systems, such as the U.N. Cluster, and was perceived as
unwieldy.244
The Ebola outbreak placed a spotlight on the ineffectiveness of
international governance, in particular WHO, in responding to infectious
disease outbreaks. Yet, whether the international community will act decisively
on the recommendations issued by multiple commissions remains to be seen.
Through addressing governance reforms, such as better internal and external
coordination, and more effective and transparent decision making, WHO can
more effectively meet its mission. Ultimately, WHO remains dependent on its
Member States for increased funding, political support, and implementation of
its norms. Will Member States pull back from populist trends and empower an
effective WHO?

244

U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL, supra note, at 147, at ¶ 78.
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Table II: Four Global Commissions to Advance Global Governance—
WHO Emergency Operations and Response245

E. Resilient Health Systems: The Foundation of Global Health Security
Since Ebola was first identified in 1976, there have been at least fifteen
outbreaks in Sub-Saharan Africa; before 2014, all had been rapidly
contained.246 Why was the West African epidemic so much worse? Part of the
answer lies in the weak health systems of the countries affected. In countries
with a well-functioning health system, outbreaks can be rapidly brought under
control—as occurred when Nigeria experienced a worrying outbreak at the

245
Gostin et al., supra note 132, at 6 (citing to Table 5: “Recommendations from the Four Global
Commissions Concerning Global Governance—WHO Emergency Operations and Response”).
246
Jon Greenberg, Counting the Number of Ebola Outbreaks Since 1976, POLITIFACT (Oct. 22, 2014,
11:57 AM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/oct/22/corey-hebert/counting-numberebola-outbreaks/.
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height of the Ebola epidemic.247 In contrast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea
had among the world’s lowest-ranking healthcare systems.248
Creating effective health systems is therefore both a public health and legal
imperative. The global health system is only as strong as the weakest health
system. Wealthy countries depend on developing States’ capacity to detect and
then halt the spread of disease before it spills over international borders.
Accordingly, uniformly strong health systems are not simply in the interests of
lower-income States.
From a public health perspective, how a society orders, finances, regulates,
and monitors national health systems implicates who lives and who dies. How
should a health system function? WHO specifies six “building blocks”:
“(i) service delivery, (ii) health workforce, (iii) health information systems,
(iv) access to essential [vaccines and] medicines, (v) financing, and
(vi) leadership/governance.”249 These require adequate and equitable
distribution of in-hospital and community health services, trained health
workers, essential vaccines and medicines, and health information systems.250
Importantly, good health systems focus on population-based services,
including surveillance, health education, sanitation, hygiene, and vector control
(such as controlling mosquito breeding grounds).251
A strong health system reduces disease transmissibility and susceptibility,
as it ensures that all individuals have prompt access to care. For example,
“treatment as prevention” for HIV/AIDS has been a stunning success.252
Individuals on strict regimens of antiretroviral treatment (ART) are virtually
unable to transmit the virus, while pre-exposure HIV prophylaxis (PrEP) can
significantly reduce susceptibility to the virus.253 But when individuals cannot

247
See Successful Ebola Responses in Nigeria, Senegal and Mali, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (Jan. 2015),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/nigeria/en/.
248
See Ajay Tandon et al., Measuring Overall Health System Performance for 191 Countries, (World
Health Org. GPE Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 30, 2000), http://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf.
249
MONITORING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS: A HANDBOOK OF INDICATORS AND THEIR
MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES, at vi, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2010) [hereinafter MONITORING
THE BUILDING BLOCKS].
250
Id. at xi–xii.
251
See generally id.
252
HIV Treatment as Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/risk/art/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
253
See generally Michael Hagmann, Study Confirms Effectiveness of Antiretroviral Drugs for HIV
Patients, 81 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 918 (2003); Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
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access or afford countermeasures,254 how can a community be immune to a
controllable disease or be protected by the herd immunity that prevents the
spread of disease?255
Across the globe, individuals struggle to access basic health services. Many
countries have wholly inadequate health facilities. In West Africa, during the
Ebola outbreak, poor road systems and inadequate transportation made it
difficult for patients to travel to treatment centers and for blood samples to get
to laboratories,256 imposing harmful—and sometimes fatal—delays. In SubSaharan Africa, about 40% of tuberculosis cases were detected and
successfully treated in 2013; in South Asia, this figure was about 50%; and in
Latin America and the Caribbean, this number was less than 60%.257 The
inaccessibility of care impacts everything from immunization rates to
availability of clean water and sanitation to outbreak prevention and
response.258
Even if patients reach a hospital, there may be no staff to offer treatment.259
Indeed, an inadequate public health workforce was a central factor during the
Ebola epidemic. There were too few trained epidemiologists and laboratory
workers, and poor infection control in clinics and hospitals.260 Health workers
used personal protective equipment (PPE) sporadically and inconsistently,
sometimes repeatedly using single-use disposable PPE.261 Many facilities
suffered from staff shortages, insufficient soap and other hygienic supplies,
and limited capacity to safely dispose of contaminated waste.262 Thus,
tragically, 881 doctors, nurses, and midwives contracted Ebola during the West

254

Hagmann, supra note 253.
See generally Paul E.M. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS.
265 (1993).
256
See Factors that Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded Rapid
Containment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/
en/.
257
See TRACKING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] & WORLD
BANK GROUP [WBG] 75 (2015).
258
See id. at 18.
259
See Irene Garcia-Subirats et al., Barriers in Access to Healthcare in Countries with Different Health
Systems. A Cross-Sectional Study in Municipalities of Central Colombia and North-Eastern Brazil, 106 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 204, 208 (2014).
260
Kevin Sack et al., How Ebola Roared Back, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/30/health/how-ebola-roared-back.html?mcubz=3.
261
See HEALTH WORKER EBOLA INFECTIONS IN GUINEA, LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: A PRELIMINARY
REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 10 (2015).
262
See id.
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Africa Ebola epidemic, 513 of whom died from the virus.263 Without better
preparation, training, and tools, the health workforce will not only experience
its own losses, but be less effective in controlling the next outbreak.
To remedy this, governments must promote worker education and retention
by prioritizing a well-trained and sustainable health workforce.264 In November
of 2013, WHO reported a deficit of 7.2 million health workers; by 2035, that
number is expected to increase to 12.9 million.265 The problem stems largely
from low-quality or insufficient training and failure to retain professionals,
many of whom are drawn by the lure of richer countries. Only 168 medical
schools exist across all forty-seven Sub-Saharan African countries; eleven
countries have no medical schools, and twenty-four countries have only one.266
Without greater investments, a strong health force is illusory.
A novel outbreak can lead to a breakdown in routine care in already
stretched systems. During the Ebola outbreak, ill-prepared hospitals shut down
to prevent in-hospital-transmission of the virus; emergency obstetric care
decreased dramatically, leading to increased maternal mortality.267 Staff
shortages required reducing hospital capacity.268 Patients attending healthcare
facilities to treat noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) declined;269 while routine
immunization services were disrupted.270 The Ebola epidemic instigated a 50%
reduction in malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV treatment services in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. With the wholesale breakdown in care and the
diversion of funding to fight Ebola, people succumbed to everyday diseases;
by the end of the outbreak, an estimated 10,623 additional people died of HIV,
tuberculosis, and malaria.271
263
See EBOLA SITUATION REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 3 (2015); see also Cost of
the Ebola Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/
2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html (last visited July 3, 2017).
264
See ANNA NICHOLSON ET AL., GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK: RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE
HEALTH SYSTEMS TO RESPOND TO GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS 38, 41 (2016).
265
Global Health Workforce Shortage to Reach 12.9 Million in Coming Decades, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/health-workforce-shortage/en/.
266
See id.
267
See Kim J. Brolin Ribacke et al., The Impact of the West Africa Ebola Outbreak on Obstetric Health
Care in Sierra Leone, PLOS ONE 2 (Feb. 24, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0150080 (discussing the negative repercussions of the Ebola outbreak on maternal health care).
268
See, e.g., id. at 6.
269
T. Samba et al., Non-communicable Diseases in the Western Area District, Sierra Leone, Before and
During the Ebola Outbreak, 7 PUB. HEALTH ACTION SUPP. S16, S20 (2017).
270
See J.W.T. Elston et al., Impact of the Ebola Outbreak on Health Systems and Population Health in
Sierra Leone, 38 J. PUB. HEALTH 674, 674–75 (2015).
271
See Alyssa S. Parpia et al., Effects of Response to 2014–2015 Ebola Outbreak on Deaths from
Malaria, HIV/AIDS, and Tuberculosis, West Africa, 22 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 433, 439 (2016); see
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Many low-resource countries, particularly in Africa, lack the diagnostic,
tracking, and reporting tools necessary for a strong disease surveillance
system,272 leaving disease incidence woefully misunderstood and
underreported. Without effective surveillance, outbreak detection and
assessment becomes disorganized, and response too often fails.273 Essential
medicines, including antibiotics and antiviral medications, are often
unavailable to individuals in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Western
Pacific.274 Substandard and falsified medications can create antibiotic
resistance and harm efforts to contain the spread of disease.275 Laws,
regulations, and policies must be in place to manage the health system.276
If an infectious disease outbreak takes hold, States with robust health
systems will have the power to mitigate its impact. Health systems with
capable disease surveillance can detect a disease risk quickly, assess that risk,
and respond accordingly.277 Outbreak preparedness includes having welldesigned plans and protocols in place, as well as stockpiling vaccines,
medicines, and personal protective equipment.278 Without sound preparation,
health ministries, providers, and communities can waste valuable time making
decisions about how to respond rather than executing an already well-devised
plan. That critical period can constitute the difference in how quickly and
extensively an infectious disease spreads.
The public health system is also the first line of defense against
bioterrorism—the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other agents to

also Cost of the Ebola Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html (last visited July 3, 2017).
272
Ernest Tambo et al., Need of Surveillance Response Systems to Combat Ebola Outbreaks and Other
Emerging Infectious Diseases in African Countries, 3 INFECTIOUS DISEASES POVERTY, 2014, at 1, 5.
273
See NICHOLSON ET AL., supra note 264, at 65–66.
274
See Sheila Mysorekar, Silent Murder, International Relations and Cooperation, DEV. &
COOPERATION (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/medicines-are-too-expensive-poor-people-developingcountries-local-production-could-make. See generally 19TH WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2015) (listing of medicines to fulfill the minimal medical needs for
the priority diseases in a basic health-care system).
275
Atholl Johnston & David W. Holt, Substandard Drugs: A Potential Crisis for Public Health, 78
BRITISH J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 218, 225–27 (2014).
276
See Roger Magnusson et al., ADVANCING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: THE VITAL ROLE OF LAW, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1–2 (2017).
277
See generally PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2011),
[hereinafter PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK].
278
Id.
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cause illness or death in people, and also in animals or plants.279 The “health
care system should rapidly identify threats, help to prevent the spread of
disease in the population, and care for infected patients.”280 The threat is so
grave that, under international law, the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, and stockpiling
biological weapons.281 However, in the absence of a formal verification regime
to monitor compliance, the BWC has limited effectiveness. States Parties,
moreover, have thus far failed to adopt a supplementary protocol authorizing
objective verification. Further, implementation capacities for the BWC are
underfunded.282 The 1997 U.N. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings also makes the use of biological weapons against a civilian
population a war crime, and potentially a crime against humanity.283 Still,
criminal and political sanction cannot supplement adequate preparedness
through a responsive health system.
Finally, to ensure global health security, health must be reflected across
government, including through a “One Health” approach. This holistic
response to infectious disease involves forging links between scientists and
ministries concerned with human and animal health. It focuses on zoonotic
diseases that spread from animals to humans, such as HIV, Ebola, and
SARS.284 WHO and the OIE recognize the importance of the approach and
have accordingly established an operational framework.285
One Health recognizes that monitoring diseases in animals can serve as an
early warning; West Nile virus often kills birds before humans experience
symptoms, for example.286 Further, preventing disease in animals can reduce

279

See David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 7–8

(2002).
280
Matthew K. Wynia & Lawrence O. Gostin, Ethical Challenges in Preparing for Bioterrorism:
Barriers Within the Health Care System, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1096, 1097 (2004).
281
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, Mar. 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T.
583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
282
See Gregory D. Koblentz & Paul F. Walker, Can Bill Gates Rescue the Bioweapons Convention?,
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 3, 2017), http://thebulletin.org/can-bill-gates-rescue-bioweapons-convention10665.
283
See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
284
See One Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/ (last
updated Aug. 4, 2017).
285
See WHO-OIE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE HUMAN-ANIMAL
INTERFACE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] & WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH ix–x
(2014).
286
See One Health, supra note 284.
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transmission to humans.287 In India, dog vaccination brought a decline of
human rabies cases to zero.288 Pursuing a One Health approach can be cost
effective. In Canada, integrating animal and human facilities led to a 26%
reduction in operation costs.289
Similarly, a One Health approach to AMR addresses food production and
the health system: going beyond highly targeted policies such as improved
clinical and patient education. Broader reforms need to be socially and
institutionally embedded, such as more humane food production, without
intense factory farming that requires heavy antibiotic prophylaxis; health
systems capable of controlling infections and testing for resistance; and law
enforcement to prevent and prosecute trafficking in fake medicines. Political
momentum is growing, such as the 2016 U.N. High-Level meeting and G7
Health Ministers’ declaration on AMR, but it remains to be seen whether the
world will spring into action in time.290
1. States’ Duties to Conform to Global Norms
States are legally obliged to prepare for, and effectively respond to, disease
outbreaks. At the international level, states have committed to prioritizing
strong health systems through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the
IHR, and the right to health. The IHR are legally binding on all 196 States
Parties. Further, all WHO Member States (except South Sudan) have ratified at
least one international treaty committed to upholding the right to health.291 The
Constitution of the WHO also recognizes a right to health, while the Alma Ata
declaration proclaimed a goal of “health for all” in 1978.292 Furthermore, the
right to health is incorporated into many national constitutions and domestic
statutes, legally binding a government to ensure that the national health system
realizes and maintains that right.293
287
See One Health Basics: Zoonotic Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/basics/zoonotic-diseases.html (last updated July 14, 2017).
288
WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at 28 tbl.8.1.
289
See id. at x.
290
See Press Release, Gen. Assembly, U.N., High-Level Meeting on Antimicrobial Resistance (Sept. 21,
2016), http://www.un.org/pga/71/2016/09/21/press-release-hl-meeting-on-antimicrobial-resistance/; see also
DECLARATION OF THE G7 HEALTH MINISTERS OF 8 - 9 OCTOBER 2015, G7 GERMANY 3 (2015).
291
See Lawrence Gostin & Devi Sridhar, Global Health and the Law, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1732, 1736
(2014).
292
E.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 139, at pmbl.; see also
DECLARATION OF ALMA ATA, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] arts. 2–3 (Sept. 6–12, 1978).
293
See THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES OF THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION SOUTH-EAST ASIA REGION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] REGIONAL OFFICE FOR
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 2–3 (2011).
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2. The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
Post-World War II, the international community enshrined health as a
global public good, creating a trilogy of inspirational instruments. On
December 10, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a common standard for the universal
respect for human rights, including the right to health.294 In the ensuing years,
States have negotiated further international human rights treaties, enshrining a
raft of rights relating to good health, including the rights to health, to life, and
to a safe environment, without discrimination.295 Yet, accountability for
adherence to the right to health is weak. While human rights treaty bodies
require State reporting and permit “shadow” reporting by civil society
organizations, they cannot coerce States to adhere to treaty norms.296 Human
rights abuses, including abuses of the right to health, remain common.297
3. The Sustainable Development Goals
Building on existing commitments, in 2015, 193 United Nations Member
States adopted the SDGs, with a bold vision: healthy people living on a
habitable planet. Goal 3 addresses health, whereby governments agree to
“[e]nsure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.”298 Universal
health coverage (UHC) is one of the most important health targets: quality
promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative, and palliative health services;

294

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 11–12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1, 3–4, 6, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
296
See U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights: Civil and Political Rights Fact Sheet
No. 15, 17 (May 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf; U.N. Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Monitoring the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIntro.aspx (last visited
July 13, 2017).
297
See Statistics of Recommendations, UPR INFO, https://www.upr-info.org/database/statistics/index_
issues.php?fk_issue=41&cycle= (last visited July 13, 2017) (showing human rights issues statistics on the
Universal Periodic Review recommendations and voluntary pledges, such as since 2008, 1,712
recommendations to 184 States were made regarding the right to health).
298
See Goal 3: Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Well Being for All at All Ages, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/health/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018); see also Historic New
Sustainable Development Agenda Unanimously Adopted by 193 U.N. Members, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 25,
2015),
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-developmentagenda-unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/.
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access to safe, effective, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines; and
protection from financial hardship.299
The SDGs are not legally binding, but aspirational goals.300 Despite the
absence of formal legal authority, the SDGs still embed a collective
international responsibility to ensure good health. While they aspire to vastly
reduce poverty and ill health, the SDGs will require resource mobilization,
measurable indicators, and accountability mechanisms.
4. International Health Regulations
While the SDGs and the right to health set high-level norms for robust
health systems, the IHR impose specific and concrete obligations on states to
develop national capacities to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks.301 Yet
by 2014, little more than 30% of States Parties reported meeting these
responsibilities.302 Further, the noncompliance rate is likely higher, as this is
based on self-evaluation. High-income states have not offered developing
countries the resources needed to shore up core capacities, despite IHR
language encouraging collaboration.303 WHO, moreover, cannot impose
sanctions on states for failing to fulfill responsibilities, and the agency does not
have many incentives to offer to non-complying states. Crucial reforms include
rigorous matrices for meeting health system capacities, independent external
evaluations, transparency, and accountability.304
In 2016, WHO announced a new framework to monitor IHR core
capacities, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE).305 JEE, which integrates and
improves upon President Obama’s Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
matrices,306 relies on external independent experts working alongside national
299
See TRACKING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE: FIRST GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] & WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG] 7 (2015).
300
See Jerome Amir Singh, The Sustainable Development Goals, 29 SIGHT & LIFE MAG., 2015 at 58, 58.
301
World Health Organization International Health Regulations, art. 5, 2005, 2509 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter IHR]; see also id. at annex 1.
302
See Spotlight: International Health Regulations 2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/ihr/ (last updated July 6, 2015).
303
See IHR, supra note 301, at annex 1(a).
304
See Director-General, World Health Org. [WHO], 69th World Health Assembly, Implementation of
the International Health Regulations (2005): Report of the Review Committee on the Role of the International
Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response, WHO Doc. A69/21 (May 13, 2016); Joint
External Evaluation Tool: International Health Regulations, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2016).
305
See Director-General, World Health Org. [WHO], 69th World Health Assembly, Implementation of
the International Health Regulations (2005): Annual Report on the Implementation of the International Health
Regulations (2005), ¶ 17, WHO Doc. A69/20 (May 18, 2016).
306
Press Release, Office of Press Sec’y, White House, Executive Order—Advancing the Global Health

GOSTIN GALLEYPROOFS2

386

3/30/2018 9:22 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:337

health officials, with outcomes made fully transparent.307 Governments are
then expected to develop country action plans. JEE is voluntary; as of 2017,
thirty-three States had completed evaluations, with thirty-two more planning to
undertake the JEE.308 However, there is a five-year interval between JEE
evaluations,309 which is too long given the need for up-to-date capacities.
WHO also encourages States to conduct in-country simulations, such as
“tabletop” exercises—role-playing a national health emergency.310
Still, the IHR is unlikely to reach its full potential unless political leaders
prioritize funding and empower WHO. The JEE is critically underfunded.
While the GHSA provided $1 billion toward building and evaluating core
capacities,311 the Trump Administration is unlikely to reauthorize GHSA
funding. The World Bank’s PEF could condition grants based on completion
of the JEE process, but PEF itself is narrowly focused and under-funded.312
One approach could be for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to include
national preparedness in its macro-economic assessments. Countries pay close
attention to IMF assessments because it expands their access to capital.313
Long-term, sustainable funding is necessary to guarantee effectiveness.
F. Equitable Research and Development
When novel diseases take hold and spread, particularly in lower-income
countries, the absence of effective vaccines and treatments is painfully
obvious. Think about most of the major global health crises in recent
memory—there were few, if any, medical countermeasures in the research and
development (R&D) pipeline. From SARS and MERS, to Ebola and Zika,
nations were bereft of effective countermeasures, instead left to implement
crude responses such as isolation and quarantine, along with fever-screening at
the borders.
Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats (Nov. 4, 2016).
307
See Joint External Evaluation Tool: International Health Regulations, supra note 304.
308
Joint External Evaluation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
globalhealth/healthprotection/fieldupdates/winter-2017/joint-external-evaluation.html (last visited July 13,
2017).
309
Joint External Evaluation Tool: International Health Regulations, supra note 304.
310
WHO SIMULATION EXERCISE MANUAL, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2017).
311
See GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENCY: PROGRESS
AND EARLY IMPACT FROM U.S. INVESTMENT, https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/ghsa-legacy-report.pdf?sfvrsn=12 (last visited Feb. 17, 2018); What is GHSA?, GLOBAL
HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, https://ghsagenda.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
312
See Jeff Tyson, Inside the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility, DEVEX (May 23, 2016),
https://www.devex.com/ news/inside-the-world-bank-s-pandemic-emergency-facility-88195.
313
See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 34.
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How do states transition from a landscape of underinvestment and delayed
R&D for infectious diseases—whether ancient scourges like tuberculosis,
reemerging infections like Ebola, or AMR pathogens—to robust investment
and rapid deployment? Emerging and resurgent infectious diseases demand
tools and technologies, such as vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, personal
protective equipment, and medical devices. Yet, novel infectious diseases lack
market-driven incentives: the next epidemic is difficult to predict and likely to
hit poor countries first.
As evident from the Ebola commission reports, an effective R&D strategy
requires an international coordinating entity; sustainable investments;
convergence of diverse regulatory pathways; and access to intellectual
property, data, and biological samples—ensuring rigorous scientific
standards.314 To ensure rapid rollout of medical countermeasures, the R&D
community must cultivate knowledge and products ready for advanced
development when an outbreak strikes. The potential of medical
countermeasures to contain outbreaks or minimize harm make them vital
investments. How do we transition from an R&D landscape where a vaccine
can take over ten years to develop315 to investment and rapid deployment?
Have recent initiatives gone far enough?
1. Perverse R&D Incentives Fueling Health Inequalities
Pharmaceutical companies have financial incentives to invest in treatments
for “profitable” diseases, not novel viruses or diseases endemic in poor
countries. Diseases like tuberculosis that are concentrated among poorer,
marginalized populations have a low global priority for research and
development. For instance, for decades, research into new drugs for
tuberculosis all but ground to a halt—leaving patients with complex, lengthy
drug regimens with, particularly for multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, serious
side effects. With a renewed focus on tuberculosis following the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), funding for tuberculosis R&D rose from $358
million in 2005 to $637 million in 2009.316 Yet, it remains only a fraction of

314

See id. at 72; see also EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 147, at 21–22.
See Lena H. Sun, Scientists Don’t Have a Decade to Find a Zika Vaccine. They Need Volunteers
Now, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/threevolunteers-on-the-front-lines-of-zika-vaccine-testing/2017/01/12/9d0f1b76-bbff-11e6-ac85094a21c44abc_story.html?utm_term=.fcdc74934aaa.
316
MIKE FRICK, TREATMENT ACTION GRP., 2015 REPORT ON TUBERCULOSIS RESEARCH FUNDING
TRENDS, 2005–2014: A DECADE OF DATA 3 (2015).
315
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what is needed.317 Strategic investments in and altered incentive systems for
R&D could restock the antimicrobial pipeline. For instance, a modest security
dividend of $16 billion every ten years could support fifteen new drugs.318
Like tuberculosis, Ebola and Zika are not new diseases—Ebola emerged
nearly four decades ago, and Zika was first detected in humans in 1952.319 Yet,
in recent outbreaks, countermeasures were not prioritized, and when they
escalated into global health emergencies, there was no operational vaccine.
This inertia is attributable not to biology and science, but the low priority,
limited funding, and practical challenges of conducting human trials for
episodic infections. A mere $3.2 billion was invested in R&D of more than
twenty neglected diseases in 2013, compared to $500 million for Ebola when
the outbreak occurred.320 Driven by the recent outbreak, an Ebola vaccine—
rVSV-ZEBOV—is now in the final stages, but it required major investments
from both public and private entities.321 This vaccine is in fact not new; it was
first created in 2003, but stalled due to prohibitive costs, which the countries
known to experience Ebola were ill-equipped to pay.322 But will those without
the means be able to access the vaccine in time? Despite huge public
investments in developing a Zika vaccine, the United States controversially
sold exclusive rights of a potential vaccine to a pharmaceutical company,
meaning that States affected by Zika may have to buy the vaccine back at
exorbitant costs.323
While international law recognizes the need for exceptions to strict patent
protections in these emergency situations, States are often unwilling or unable
to exercise these rights. For instance, the Doha Declaration underscores States’
rights to use flexibilities that provide exceptions and limitations to improve

317

Id.
Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Reimagining WHO: Leadership and Action for a New
Director-General, 389 LANCET 755, 755 (2017).
319
See Zika Virus, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
zika/en/; see also Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 2017), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs103/en/.
320
See U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL, supra note 147, at ¶¶ 185, 216.
321
See News Release, World Health Org., Final Trial Results Confirm Ebola Vaccine Provides High
Protection Against Disease (Dec. 23, 2016).
322
See Ed Yong, A Global Plan to Defend Against the Future’s Deadliest Diseases, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/cepi-vaccines/513335/.
323
See Alison Kodjak, States Fear Price of New Zika Vaccine Will Be More than They Can Pay, NPR
(May 30, 2017, 7:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/05/30/529887446/states-fear-priceof-new-zika-vaccine-will-be-more-than-they-can-pay.
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availability and accessibility of essential medicines.324 The Declaration further
provides for compulsory licensing325 and parallel importation of patented
medicines for countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities.326 Yet,
politics, pressure from industry, and lack of legal capacity often inhibit States’
abilities to exercise these protections, meaning that nationals lack access to life
saving countermeasures.327
2. Solidarity Through WHO
To address these limitations, WHO should prioritize potentially high-value
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapies for pathogens with pandemic potential as
well as their equitable distribution. To enable researchers to develop a vaccine
for novel pathogens, the first step is to identify, and then share the pathogen. In
the case of pandemic influenza, WHO Member States have agreed on
innovative global governance arrangements. WHO’s Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS)—formerly the Global Influenza
Surveillance Network—serves as a global alert system for the emergence of
influenza with pandemic potential. GISRS monitors the evolution of influenza
viruses and provides recommendations regarding laboratory diagnostics,
vaccines, antiviral susceptibility, and risk assessment.328
GISRS, however, is a non-binding system, which means that states are not
mandated to share virus samples with WHO laboratories. In 2007, the system
was shaken by Indonesia’s assertion of sovereignty, grounded on the
Convention on Biological Diversity, over influenza A(H5N1) isolated within
its territory. Indonesia argued that pharmaceutical companies were gaining free
access to its nationals’ “property,” only to sell the eventual vaccine back at

324
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; Do Hyung Kim, Research Guide on
TRIPS and Compulsory Licensing: Access to Innovative Pharmaceuticals for Least Developed Countries,
GLOBALEX (Feb. 2007), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/TRIPS_Compulsory_Licensing.html.
325
See Doha Declaration, supra note 324, at ¶ 5.
326
See id. at ¶ 6; see also Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3–4 (Carlos M. Correa &
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds., 3d ed. 2016).
327
See Kim, supra note 324.
328
See World Health Org. [WHO], 64th World Health Assembly, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework for Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, at 33, WHO Doc.
A64/8 (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter PIP Framework] (“Annex 4: Guiding Principles for the development of
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(GISRS) laboratories for H5N1 and other human pandemic influenza viruses”).
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exorbitant costs.329 This was not without grounds; during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic, wealthy countries had agreements with pharma companies that
enabled them to access the vaccine, whereas poorer countries did not.330
Following Indonesia’s refusal to share the virus, WHO adopted the
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework in May 2011, following
years of tense negotiations.331 The framework is a landmark in global
governance for health, representing the first international agreement on
influenza virus and benefit sharing. States commit to voluntarily share viruses
with GISRS, guided by the principle of solidarity. While the framework is not
legally binding on States, companies enter binding contracts where they agree
to make contributions to WHO, providing benefits to developing countries
(such as vaccine donations and granting royalty-free licenses to manufacturers
in developing countries) in exchange for access to biological materials needed
for R&D. The PIP Framework, however, does not expressly cover genetic
sequencing data that are increasingly used to transfer knowledge. Nor does it
cover non-pandemic influenza materials or, for that matter, any other pathogen,
such as Ebola, Zika, or corona viruses. Therefore, it is necessary to extend
these protections to other types of viruses to ensure equitable distribution.
3. Galvanizing Action
The failure of industry to swiftly and equitably develop vaccines has
galvanized international action. For instance, the U.N. High-Level Panel
recommended developing a $1 billion funding mechanism. The panel advised
that funds should be directed to global priorities, abiding by the principles of
open access and data sharing, and that research products should be treated as
public goods.332
Firstly, responding to recommendations for greater engagement from
WHO in R&D, 333 WHO established an R&D Blueprint for Action to reduce
delay between declaring an emergency and the availability of medical
interventions.334 It will include a Global Coordination Mechanism (GCM) with
329
See Laurie Garrett & David P. Fidler, Sharing H5N1 Viruses to Stop a Global Influenza Pandemic,
4 PLOS MED. 1712, 1712–13 (2007).
330
See Noni MacDonald, H1N1 Influenza Vaccine: Global Access for a Global Problem, 181 CMAJ
123 (2009).
331
See PIP Framework, supra note 328.
332
See Moon et al., supra note 147.
333
See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 69.
334
See AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (2017).
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WHO at the helm.335 The Blueprint’s focus includes: prioritization of a
shortlist of pathogens most likely to lead to epidemics, developing an
operational plan to transition from preparedness to response, identifying
research priorities for urgent pathogens, coordinating stakeholders and
expanding capacity, assessing preparedness and impact of intervention, and
exploring funding models for R&D preparedness and response.336
Secondly, and drawing on the Blueprint, CEPI was launched in January
2017 at the World Economic Forum. CEPI is a partnership between
governments and the private sector, including the Gates Foundation and
leading pharmaceutical companies. It focuses on prioritizing global infectious
disease threats, identifying research priorities, global coordination and
expanding capacity, continuous assessment, and mobilizing funding.337
CEPI aims to stimulate the development of new vaccines against diseases
that could cause the next devastating epidemic but do not offer a sufficient
economic incentive for pharmaceutical companies. For now, CEPI is focusing
on three diseases (MERS, Nipah, and Lassa fever), bringing vaccines from
development through preclinical research.338 The vaccines will then be stored
in a holding pattern until an outbreak, and they can be rapidly tested and
accelerated toward manufacture deployment. CEPI has already raised
$540 million, with pledges totaling $790 million.339
Accelerated research is also needed to maximize knowledge of pathogens
with pandemic potential, including hundreds yet to be discovered, establishing
a foundation of knowledge for outbreak detection and future research. Since
2009, one such effort, the PREDICT project, has identified more than 820
novel viruses in wild animals and humans in thirty countries.340 Such efforts

335
See Global Coordination Mechanism, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/blueprint/what/
improving-coordination/global_coordination_mechanism/en/ (last visited July 13, 2017).
336
See AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS, supra note 334.
337
See Approach, CEPI, http://cepi.net/approach (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) (“CEPI wants to galvanise
the development of new vaccines against diseases we know could cause the next devastating epidemic.”).
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(Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2017/01/new-460-million-effort-takes-aimmers-lassa-nipah.
339
See Michael Dumiak, A Crisis Gives You Wings, 21 IAVIREPORT, 2017, at 4, 4–5; PREDICT: The
World’s Most Comprehensive Zoonotic Disease Surveillance & Capacity Development Program, U.C. DAVIS
VETERINARY MED., http://www.vetmed.ucdavis.edu/ohi/predict/predict_what-weve-found.cfm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2017).
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are eminently affordable—$175 million is supporting PREDICT’s work in
thirty-five countries341 —and need to be brought to scale in every country.
At the same time, scientific freedom and biosecurity must be balanced.
While open research is vital to scientific breakthroughs, dual use research of
concern can also pose biosecurity threats, especially in less secure facilities.
Researchers could further recreate an ancient virus, like smallpox, which could
either improve the existing vaccine or be potentially manipulated to form a
dangerous virus.342 While access to certain genetic materials, like smallpox, is
prohibited, other materials are easy to access through the internet. Dual use
research of concern goes through an extra round of review in the United States,
while WHO cautions that no institution should hold more than 20% of the
smallpox virus’s genome.343 Yet, there are no universal rules, and biosecurity
measures vary considerably. Even if there were rules, it is near impossible to
monitor every company in the world.
Effective R&D for global health security requires investment from multiple
actors. As pharma companies often lack financial incentives, nation States and
private donors should support and invest in an R&D agenda driven by equity,
solidarity, and economic sense. Otherwise, when the next epidemic strikes—be
it severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome, Nipah, or a yet unheard-of
pathogen—the international community will be as ill prepared as ever.
G. Effectively Communicating Public Health Messages
Lastly, failures in communication systems between health workers,
patients, community members, and public health officials undermine timely,
transparent, and accurate information during an outbreak.344 Outbreaks trigger
panic and can undermine the trust that is central to an effective response. The
devastation caused by Ebola was escalated by a deep distrust among
communities of the government and foreigners, as their governments had a
history of corruption, poor governance, and even brutality.345 This created
major obstacles for WHO, governments, and other responders, as people failed
to heed public health messages.
341
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Yet, public authorities often overreact, and reach for counterproductive
measures that drive fear. During the SARS epidemic of 2003, China and
Singapore employed mass quarantines, sometimes monitored by guards or
ankle bracelets.346 In Taiwan, over 150,000 individuals were quarantined,
although there were only twenty-four confirmed cases.347 In the Republic of
Korea, breaking quarantine for MERS-CoV was made a criminal offense,
risking up to two years in prison.348 Where nations target the vulnerable or
neglect disadvantaged groups, they erode the values necessary to promote
public trust. During the West African Ebola outbreak, authorities in Liberia
cordoned off the West Point slum of the capital where the disease was rapidly
spreading.349 Cordon sanitaire imposes enormous social, economic, and trust
costs for very few benefits. There are few instances where it is appropriate.
Riots broke out, and in the chaos, authorities shot a fifteen-year-old boy.350
Poor communication exacerbated the distrust, led to resistance, and eventually
resulted in violence. In one horrifying instance, villagers in rural Guinea
attacked and killed eight health workers and journalists.351
Instead, to build trust and stability, governments’ responses to outbreaks
must be driven by solidarity. Vulnerable communities should not be
abandoned. Health authorities should mitigate fear and promote trust by
providing evidence-based prevention and adequate treatment. States should
further strive for a more coherent balance between individual freedoms and
public health necessity. In light of states’ obligations under international
human rights law, public health powers are not unlimited, but must be
exercised in a manner proportionate to the threat, and should be non-

346
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discriminatory and evidence-based. Any infringement of liberty must be the
least restrictive alternative.352
The Ebola epidemic also illustrated how cultural factors can facilitate the
spread of disease, and the importance of conveying and implementing public
health messages in a manner that is culturally sensitive. With burial rituals a
key factor in the spread of Ebola in the region, WHO and others failed to
appreciate the value of an anthropological approach to stopping the
epidemic.353 A traditional funeral and burial ceremony of an Ebola-infected
deceased person resulted in more than 300 new Ebola cases.354 Health workers
belatedly pursued the support of community leaders, who were persuaded to
adapt cultural beliefs, such as burial practices, in light of the emergency.355
Lately, WHO has supported the deployment of anthropologists to help
understand local culture, behavior and traditions.356 Control measures like
changes to burial practices and quarantine require deep local cultural
knowledge, which civil society, the community, and experts can bring. Again,
trust between communities and officials is vital.
Further, mass media, including social networking, can either be a tool for
fighting infectious disease or an instigator for greater spread. During an
outbreak, people are desperate for any useful information, regardless of its
source (traditional mass media, such as radio, television, or newspaper; or
social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube). However, the
information circulated on social media could be misleading or dangerously
incorrect. For example, during the West African Ebola outbreak, media
overreaction in the United States fueled panic and calls for unwarranted
restrictions.357 In the affected regions, medical misinformation (such as using
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the plant ewedu as a “cure,” blood transfusions, and drinking salty water) was
commonly tweeted.358 Therefore, public health authorities and community
leaders should promote trustworthy sources, while debunking false
information.
To build trust and public ownership, effective public health interventions
should harness public support. Community-driven solutions can effectively
tailor disease control approaches to local needs. Still, communities may reject
novel approaches where their concerns are not adequately alleviated. In the
United States, constituencies in Monroe County voted fifty-eight to forty-two
in favor of releasing genetically modified mosquitoes that could reduce
populations of Aedes aegypti. But, the community of Key Haven, where the
mosquitoes would be released, opposed the resolution by a sixty-five to thirtyfive margin.359 Therefore, the populations most affected must be central to any
response.
Accordingly, governments should liaise with the community to ensure
viable public health measures. In response to ongoing circulating avian
influenzas, Chinese authorities sometimes shut down live poultry markets.
While this appears to be effective in reducing virus transmission, permanent
closures lack public support. High percentages of Chinese prefer to buy from
wet markets to ensure their meat is fresh. Instead, less disruptive practices may
be more effective, such as separating types of poultry by species, redesigning
poultry cages, and closing the markets for off-days.360
CONCLUSION: FROM AN UNVIRTUOUS CYCLE OF COMPLACENCY AND PANIC
TO GLOBAL HEALTH PREPAREDNESS
This is a pivotal moment for the future of global health security—the West
African Ebola outbreak has prompted renewed momentum. Here we set a clear
path for beefing up epidemic preparedness. Instead of lurching from crisis to
crisis, the international community should urgently translate the lessons
learned into sustained investments in pandemic preparedness. Global solidarity
and cooperation are more important than ever to address critical policy,
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operational, and capacity barriers to global health security. Enhanced health
security requires greater equity and fairness in the distribution of health
services and resources. Ultimately, this requires robust investment, invigorated
international and national leadership, resourced health systems, cutting-edge
R&D, and trust and communication. If not, when the next pandemic hits, it
might not be easily defeated. Unless the world acts now, global awareness will
fade as we tumble toward the next public health crisis.

